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 Executive Summary
Since long before the Covid-19 pandemic emerged in 2020, civic 
space has been changing all over the globe, generally becoming more 
restricted and hazardous. The pandemic brought the suspension of 
many fundamental freedoms in the name of the public good, providing 
cover for a deepening of authoritarian tendencies but also spurring 
widespread civic activism on issues suddenly all the more important, 
ranging from emergency relief to economic impacts. The Navigating 
Civic Space in a Time of Covid project has explored these dynamics 
through real-time research embedded in civil society in Mozambique, 
Nigeria, and Pakistan, grounded in a close review of global trends.
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C ivic space matters for a host of reasons. Our concern is how far it allows civil society actors freely and safely to advocate for rights, express dissent or opposition and contribute 
to public deliberation. In times of crisis, these 
freedoms acquire particular importance. The impacts 
of crisis usually fall disproportionately on marginalised 
people whose interests are least represented in 
formal democratic institutions, and need to be 
redressed through claim-making in the civic space. 
Globally, the pre-pandemic year of 2019 has been 
described as the fourteenth consecutive year of 
decline in global freedom, with ‘democracy and 
pluralism […] under assault’1. Yet even as the 
governance landscape has become more authoritarian 
and autocratic over the past two decades, instances of 
movement-based ‘people power’ have increased and 
diversified and online activism has burgeoned, even 
in settings of severely limited civic space.
From March 2020 the Covid-19 pandemic triggered a 
rash of policy and other measures that restricted civic 
freedoms in the name of public health, with striking 
similarities across the globe. The closing of civic 
space has taken a range of forms, overt and covert, 
from formal legislation and policy to highly targeted 
harassment, divide-and-rule and delegitimising 
tactics. The chilling effects of these tactics are often 
all the greater and more divisive because of their 
selective and arbitrary application. While both the 
autocratising trend and the resurgence of civic action 
were visible before, both seem to have accelerated 
and magnified since the onset of the virus. 
This report presents the findings of a collaborative 
research study exploring these dynamics in 
Mozambique, Nigeria, and Pakistan, three countries 
whose hybrid regimes combine democratic institutions 
and processes with autocratic ruling practices and 
trends of narrowing civic space. Built around a monthly 
Observatory Panel methodology, continuous event 
cataloguing and key informant interviews from June 
– December 2020, this innovative real-time research 
captured the perspectives and experiences of civil 
society actors on changes in civic space and action, 
drawing on global literature and commentary to 
situate and interpret these. We sought to understand 
what the changes mean for the future of democratic 
governance in these countries and more broadly, and 
what strategies are needed to prevent and withstand 
further closure of civic space.
The amassed evidence and commentary show 
a surge in autocratic behaviour and decline in 
democratic freedoms during the pandemic. 
An emergency heightens society’s need to be 
governed. Protecting and restoring public health 
in a pandemic requires complex and restrictive 
regulation. Responding to crisis strains the social 
contract and tests states’ and governments’ systems 
for governing the collective and distributing public 
goods. But while measures were undoubtedly 
needed, the pandemic was used as cover for 
implementing emergency measures without 
time limits, silencing or eliminating critics, and 
curtailing the three freedoms most integral to civic 
space – freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of 
expression and freedom of association. 
Against this backdrop, commentators noted 
emergent forms of civic agency and mobilisation, 
and newly important issues, actors, repertoires, 
and opportunities. As often before under military or 
authoritarian rule, in this ‘new normal’ civil society 
organisations (CSOs) and activists are devising 
strategies to navigate the space available, minimise the 
risks they face, and grasp what opportunities they can. 
Mozambique, Nigeria, and Pakistan, far from being 
exceptions in an otherwise democratic world, 
illustrate both the pre-pandemic and in-pandemic 
trends set out above. The three countries also had 
some common characteristics in the ‘old normal’ 
before the pandemic, which they shared with many 
other countries as well.
The democratic credentials of these three countries 
are neither the worst nor the best; they are hybrids, 
combining some elements of democracy, with others 
of more autocratic rule. They share post-colonial 
histories of repressive military rule; legacies of 
conflict and violence, continuing today in regions of 
each country; high levels of poverty and inequality; 
and low trust between citizens and government 
rooted in widespread perceptions of corruption.
Despite these challenging circumstances, each of 
the countries, to varying degrees, has a vibrant 
civil society and a history of informal protest and 
contention towards its ruling regime. However, true 
to autocratic regimes, this civic history does not 
reflect ample civic freedoms nor necessarily translate 
into greater voice and accountability. Pre-pandemic, 
each country was already seeing a tightening of civic 
space and activity, with growing pressure particularly 
against CSOs, media and activists directly critical of 
the status quo. A growth of restrictive legislation was 
tending to choke CSOs, online activism was under 
increasing surveillance and intervention, and the 
traditional media, although active, suffered frequent 
attack and sabotage in response to critical coverage. 
6
Less visible social and political pressures mobilised 
around religion, ethnicity, anti-Western sentiment 
or national security discourses conspired with this 
legislation to stifle dissent. 
From early 2020, the spread and severity of the 
pandemic played out differently in Mozambique, 
Nigeria, and Pakistan. While official case and death rates 
were by far the most severe in Pakistan, similarly rapid 
and drastic policy responses were seen in all countries, 
accompanied by similar narratives and attitudes. 
In each country the shock of the pandemic coincided 
with other major events, some of which overtook 
the virus in terms of public policy priority and 
even dwarfed it in terms of public perceptions. 
Key among these were the flood emergency in 
Pakistan, the pandemic-induced shock to Nigeria’s 
oil-based public finances and in all countries flare-
ups of violent conflict, never far away – Islamist 
insurgency in northern Mozambique, ethno-religious 
violence in northern Nigeria, and insurgency in 
Balochistan Province, Pakistan. These other shocks, 
some of them with profound economic and political 
ramifications, brought forth civic action of their own. 
The pandemic context both exacerbated the shocks’ 
effects and shaped the ensuing civic action. 
What happened to civic space in Mozambique, Nigeria and 
Pakistan under the pandemic? 
A key feature of the global commentary on 
governance and civic space during the pandemic 
has been the opportunity and impetus it gave 
states to consolidate and extend authoritarian and 
autocratic tendencies. 
Over and above the most obvious restrictions on 
freedom of assembly, human rights abuses and 
examples of state over-reach during the pandemic, 
more insidious and longer-standing assaults on 
civic freedoms continued. Moves to control the 
debate and silence critical voices applied as much 
online as offline. The pandemic exacerbated 
sources of division amongst civil society, and 
sometimes dissipated civic energy. Tensions and 
divisions also played out between different regions 
of each country, and between central and sub-
national authorities. The re-direction of public 
and international donor funds towards pandemic 
response provided important opportunities, but also 
threatened to be divisive.
In common with many countries around the world, 
the pandemic triggered emergency legislation and 
‘lockdown’ restrictions on many facets of life in 
all three countries. This represented a significant 
shift towards executive authority, unleashing a 
concentration of power that undermined established 
processes for public deliberation and participation. 
Lockdowns offered new latitude for ‘over-reach’ by 
authorities, in particular police and security forces. 
Alongside the attacks on human rights that flourished 
or ensued under cover of the pandemic, lockdown 
restrictions and the ‘securitisation’ response had the 
immediate effect of reducing the civic space available to 
challenge these tendencies. However, restrictions were 
not applied equally: different political parties, social 
classes, religions and livelihood groups experienced 
differential treatment. In all three countries the already-
familiar tactic of forced disappearance continued, 
arguably made easier by stay-at-home orders, and 
particularly targeting journalists. 
Even as the first wave of transmission waned, 
securitisation of the pandemic deepened, restrictive 
legislation was extended, and individual activists 
and dissenters were punished for protesting. In the 
background, longstanding legislative manoeuvres to 
tighten regulation of civil society continued unabated. 
Press freedom was under pressure in all three 
countries, as the pandemic heightened the sensitivities 
of those in power while exposing them to critique. 
Media outlets and journalists were singled out for 
targeted suppression or attack. States made use 
of both fake news and accusations of fake news 
in what became an information war. Over the 
year, as intimidation and fear gave rise to self-
censorship both on- and offline, general trust in even 
independent media outlets to reflect the situation 
on the ground fell away. 
As civic action moved online, so did efforts to 
undermine and regulate it, and silence critical voices.
The public health measures of the pandemic closed 
down many ‘offline’ spaces for protest, hastening a 
move to online spaces. But repression rapidly caught 
up: legal regulations were used in both Pakistan and 
Nigeria to increase state control of digital tools and 
spaces and limit free expression, and online harassment 
and trolling targeted Pakistani women journalists 
critical of the government’s Covid-19 narrative. 
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Across the three countries, the response to the 
pandemic exacerbated existing social divisions, with 
discourse and action playing into tensions between 
communities, and the pandemic hitting harder 
those already excluded or vulnerable. A more 
fractious and antagonistic public debate raised the 
stakes for those acting in civic space, particularly 
those acting for the needs of stigmatised minorities.
In the early days of the pandemic, before cases were 
widespread and community transmission accepted, it 
was often framed as an ‘imported’ virus, and supposed 
‘carrier’ population groups stigmatised. As transmission 
spread and the parallel actions of authorities to 
enforce lockdown measures and provide targeted relief 
ramped up, further tensions were inflamed, along 
pre-existing ethnic and religious fault-lines. Blasphemy 
accusations came to be used as weapons in deepening 
sectarian tensions particularly in Nigeria and Pakistan. 
The need for decisive action in the face of the 
pandemic saw not only the shift of power towards 
the executive or military discussed above, but also a 
centralisation of authority and increasing tensions 
between national and sub-national authorities. This 
had consequences for the locally empowering and 
democratising effects – actual or potential – of each 
country’s decentralisation trajectories to date. 
State of Emergency legislation tended to centralise 
power and sow tensions or confusion around 
administrative and political decentralisation, with 
national and subnational authorities diverging in 
their approaches to the pandemic in some cases. 
Tensions also arose around distribution of pandemic 
relief and aid. Overlaid on the sub-national conflicts 
and ethnic and religious tensions already going on in 
all three countries, the combined effect was to make 
civic space far from uniform across the territories, 
with divides between rural and urban areas, capital 
cities and peripheries, conflictual and stable regions, 
governing-party-led and opposition-led areas. 
The pandemic put significant financial pressure 
on governments and civic organisations alike. The 
need to re-direct resources to pandemic response 
had its own impacts on civic space. This included re-
direction of donor funds that previously supported 
a wider range of CSO activity and led to changes in 
the civic landscape in our three countries. 
In our three contexts international funding of civic 
organisations, and larger CSOs, has been important 
historically in sustaining their role in civic space. The 
re-direction of these funds to Covid-19 relief had 
mixed effects: positively, a more adaptive attitude by 
donors towards local CSOs in Nigeria, and negatively, 
the favouring of less politically challenging, more 
welfare- and humanitarian-oriented organisations 
over advocacy and rights-focused organisations in 
Mozambique and Pakistan. Competition between 
CSOs was observed to increase, weakening the 
potential for collective voice and coordinated action.
What happened to civic action? 
During the pandemic a host of public policy concerns 
became especially salient, and much civic energy 
and action shifted towards these. Action on these 
issues drew in and brought together new actors and 
new coalitions, sometimes expanding the repertoires 
of action they used to navigate the available 
space. This came about in part as the sectors and 
issues most affected by the pandemic acquired 
new urgency, but also in more subtle ways, as the 
pandemic laid bare the unfairness of the status quo.
Important shifts in civic action in Mozambique, 
Nigeria, and Pakistan since the onset of the 
pandemic have been both because of and in spite 
of the narrowing civic space. Whilst not without 
precedent in any of the countries, these shifts are clearly 
associated with the pandemic. The pandemic re-directed 
attention and civic energy towards certain issues that 
stood out in a global and national public health 
emergency. Drawn out by the changing salience of 
issues, new actors and new coalitions came to the 
fore, sometimes out of necessity and other times 
as a strategic response. With them came adjusted 
repertoires of action. The spread of digital protest 
sped up; citizen oversight mechanisms sprang up to 
monitor Covid-19 emergency relief, often empowered 
and emboldened by digital technologies; and unruly 
expressions of popular politics were common. 
Unsurprisingly, the pandemic put public healthcare 
systems under the microscope, with health systems 
worldwide struggling to cope, and healthcare workers 
on the frontline of the fight against the pandemic. 
Correspondingly, these workers and their allies 
have mobilised across the world to demand more 
resources, greater protection in the form of PPE 
and risk payments, and greater recognition. Longer-
standing grievances made common cause with 
pandemic-related mobilisations for better resourcing, 
regulation and defence of public healthcare services. 
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In these three countries as well as globally, CSOs set 
about repurposing themselves to do emergency 
relief work, as well as pressurising the state to 
provide relief and monitoring it when it did so. 
Taking on relief roles, sometimes even in partnership 
with governments, brought CSOs some room for 
manoeuvre in increasingly hostile environments. 
Attempts to hold government accountable for the 
management of significant Covid-19 relief funds – 
raised domestically and from donors overseas – were 
witnessed in Mozambique and Nigeria. Coalitions 
proved crucial for both delivering relief and holding 
government accountable. 
Education was one of the key sites of disruption 
and contention during Covid-19, against a 
background of widespread challenges in schools 
and university access and quality. Issues such as 
school and university closure and inequalities 
in remote learning brought forth demands for 
accountability from civic actors and the general 
public. Simultaneously students and teachers played 
a significant role in popular protests during this 
period. Concerns about student safety and possible 
transmission of the virus were highlighted by groups 
in all three countries, with a common theme being 
the public debate over reopening of schools.
Emergencies and crises are known to increase 
gender-based violence (GBV). Evidence confirms this 
for the Covid-19 pandemic globally. Responses and 
mobilisation from both organised and unorganised 
civil society emerged on these issues across all three 
countries in this project. The rise in GBV was met with 
petitions, physical protests, advocacy, digital activism, 
direct service provision and coordination with the 
state and other civil society actors. This civic action 
generated discussion and public condemnation of 
GBV both online and offline, and some significant 
moves to improve legal frameworks surrounding GBV 
and harassment in Nigeria and Pakistan. 
The economic impact of the pandemic was 
significant in all three countries. Immediate 
restrictions on businesses and trading were followed 
as the pandemic wore on with escalating concerns 
about livelihoods, unemployment and the costs of 
basic goods, all of which triggered new action and 
demands from civic organisations. Those reliant on 
the informal economy were particularly vulnerable, 
and the inability of social security and social 
protection systems to cushion the economic fall-out 
was laid bare in many countries. Consequently, the 
pandemic provoked several prominent instances of 
civic action led by unions, professional associations 
and unique coalitions that sought to address issues 
concerning the economy and livelihoods.
The heavy-handed and securitised response to the 
pandemic brought to crisis point a range of long-
held grievances about the insecurity facing people 
in their everyday lives, and the role of state actors 
in sustaining or causing that insecurity2. Around the 
world this manifested in a range of action, including 
protests against lockdown and public health measures. 
In all three of our countries, it created grounds for 
flashpoints in relation to law and order and the actions 
of security services of which the #EndSARS campaign 
to abolish Nigeria’s particularly brutal Special Anti-
Robbery Squad (SARS) was the most emblematic.
So what does the ‘new normal’ mean for governance in 
the longer term?
A further narrowing of the democratic arena 
where contestations, differences and inequalities 
can be managed without recourse to violence has 
happened simultaneously with the undermining 
of the actors who play key roles in speaking 
out and staking claims democratically. The 
patterns and trends we have observed and our 
interpretations of them – grounded in active 
current engagement in Mozambican, Nigerian 
and Pakistani civil society – point to three sets 
of implications: for civic space; for citizen-state 
relations; and for civil society and civic activism. 
In these contexts of fragile political pluralism, 
civic space at national and sub-national levels 
has been a crucial arena for critical dialogue, 
expression of difference and honing of oppositional 
stances. Yet the governments of Mozambique, 
Nigeria, and Pakistan have each been particularly 
swift and far-reaching in rolling back democratic 
progress under Covid by squeezing an already-
constrained civic space still further. Here and in a 
wide range of other countries, power seems likely 
to become more centralised and less shared, and 
civic space more constricted, unless there is a 
concerted global effort to protect it. 
What we have seen in 2020-21 might be just 
the beginning of an enduring securitisation of 
public health and democratic governance, in 
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which citizen-state relations are re-framed more 
antagonistically as one protects a securitised 
version of public health and civil liberties. As 
trust declines further and polarisation increases, 
elements within both ‘sides’ are likely to drive the 
other towards extremes. International aid actors 
seeking to support civil society have long needed 
to resist treating it as monolithic or uniform, 
but official and non-governmental donors to 
these three countries and the many other aid-
recipient countries undergoing similar trends will 
likely need to make harder choices about which 
civil society actors to align themselves with. To 
continue providing effective support to civic 
space and action, official bilateral aid will need to 
become more politically informed and work more 
closely with diplomatic and multilateral channels. 
Despite the evidence of newfound coalitions 
and solidarity especially early in the pandemic, 
the fissures, fragmentation and competitive 
dynamics showing up in civil society in all three 
countries look likely to increase. Civil society 
may well segment into actors that weather 
civil-society-restricting moves, those that 
circumvent them, and those that actively counter 
them. Mozambique, Nigeria, and Pakistan may see 
the emergence of small but stronger and more 
significant contentious segments of civil society 
than have existed before, even while other CSOs 
retreat from advocacy into uncontroversial service 
provision roles. Even in its evermore strategic use 
of online spaces and digital communications civil 
society will be hard-pressed to stay a jump ahead 
of state security forces’ interference as regulation 
and technology in these spaces evolve.
More positively, spurred by new levels of 
outrage around issues of equitable distribution, 
transparency and accountability thrown into relief 
by the Covid-19 pandemic, civic action has found 
fresh impetus. At least some of the coalitions 
forged in the heat of the pandemic are likely to 
endure as a safer and surer way of operating, 
perhaps maturing into deeper, cross-class alliances 
as the longer-lasting effects of the pandemic 
and policy and budget responses to it are felt on 
livelihoods and lifestyles. No less will be needed to 
hold open a further-shrinking civic space. 
The shifts in citizen-state relations we have seen 
intensify during the pandemic call for re-strategising, 
re-positioning and re-tooling by advocates of 
democracy and accountable governance at all 
levels. Activists and civic organisations will have 
difficult choices to make, and need to chart a 
careful path to maintain solidarity across causes 
and identities. International actors, including aid 
donors, need to revive approaches used in the 
least democratic settings and in less democratic 
global eras. In contexts where civil society, civic 
space and government notions of accountability 
have been heavily shaped by international aid, 
the defence of civic space and assertion of 
accountability claims over the past year by 
domestic social actors – not dominated by donors 
or international NGOs – hold particular promise. 
The energy generated to monitor civic freedoms 
and call out the democratic backsliding we have 
seen during the pandemic must be sustained, and 
both national and international attention focused 
on the dangers of emergence from the pandemic 
with our civil liberties eroded and autocratic 
governance normalised.
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 Introduction and background
The crisis of Covid-19 arrived against a backdrop of declining civic 
freedoms in both newer and more established democracies, but also a 
widely observed and simultaneous resurgence of popular protest and 
people power. The emergency heightened the need for governance. 
But the measures adopted and the way that authorities applied them 
were quickly and frequently seen as suppressing dissent and targeting 
opposition voices, spurring an active global conversation about the 
long-run implications for civic freedoms and action, and democratic 
values and norms. This is a contribution to those debates. We report 
from six months of research in Mozambique, Nigeria, and Pakistan 
during 2020. Observatory panels of civil society leaders in each country 
monitored and made sense of events in real-time, alongside extensive 
event cataloguing and inputs from the live global debates.
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Civic freedoms are in decline globally. Over many years 
pro-rights and accountability activists and campaigners 
in established and newer democracies alike have been 
operating in a space that is changing, in patterned 
ways. The crisis of the Covid-19 pandemic heightened 
attention to these patterns, as countries across the 
globe acted quickly and severely to restrict fundamental 
freedoms in the name of public health. As debates 
continue about ‘building back better’ in the wake of the 
pandemic, the reality is that many restrictions thought 
temporary one year ago are still in place. We face a 
world where the new language of lockdown heralds an 
acceptance, at least on some level, that fundamental 
freedoms can be suspended in the name of the public 
good. Not only are many restrictions still in place, but 
the evidence is increasingly clear that the cover of the 
pandemic has allowed governments to hasten their 
turn towards authoritarianism and autocratisation, 
changing the landscape in potentially permanent ways.
Simultaneously, we also witness a resurgence in people 
power and civic mobilisation both to claim rights and 
to call the system to account for injustices and lack of 
attention to issues of global urgency. Tightening civic 
space has not prevented the growth of mass movements, 
online campaigns, and popular protest. Anti-government 
protests are taking place on a significant scale in very 
different countries, and new digital tools and spaces 
afford new opportunities for action and connection. This 
civic energy was also an important part of the story of 
the pandemic – with self-help and mutual aid groups 
springing up, governments called out on their pandemic 
response, and issues of care, education, and social 
protection becoming a focus of active public debate.
These two trends – of increasing autocratisation, but 
also new expressions of ‘people power’ and civic 
dynamism – are clearly not new. But during a year of 
pandemic-induced crisis they have accelerated and 
magnified. This report looks at how these dynamics 
played out in Mozambique, Nigeria, and Pakistan – 
three countries where the space for civic dissent and 
claims for accountability and better governance was 
already constricted, and practices of autocratic rule have 
sat alongside democratic processes and institutions 
for some time. Rather than being exceptional, these 
conditions of ‘hybrid’ governance are in fact common 
globally, as are their histories of colonial rule, internal 
conflict and division, and popular struggle for democracy.
The story we tell here comes from six months of 
collaborative research by institutes and civil society actors 
in each of the three countries, convened by a research 
team at the Institute of Development Studies under the 
Action for Empowerment and Accountability research 
programme (A4EA). A4EA is a five-year programme that 
looks at how social and political action contributes to 
empowerment and accountability in contexts affected 
by fragility, conflict and violencea. Between June and 
December 2020, the research team undertook a monthly 
research cycle designed to capture events and changes in 
civic space and civic action in real time, and to understand 
these from the perspectives of those grappling with them. 
This report brings together key themes and findings 
from that process. Separate reports for each country are 
published by the research partners in the project3. 
After more than a year of a global pandemic, space for 
organised citizens to engage with authorities on public 
policy choices, to examine the decisions being made, and 
critique and offer alternatives is more necessary than 
ever. But changes in the space available, the relationships 
between civic actors and governments that shape the 
space, and the kinds of issues that have salience raise 
crucial questions for the future. What genies has the 
pandemic let out of the lamp? What does that mean 
for our democratic futures in the coming years? What 
strategies do civic actors and those that support them 
need to take now to prevent further closures?
We turn to these longer-term questions in the final section 
of our report. The next part of this first section outlines the 
approach we took to researching these issues in real time 
from the perspectives of those grappling with them. We 
then look at the status of civic space, freedoms and action 
globally before the pandemic and during the past year. 
Section 2 turns to the countries, exploring the pre-pandemic 
context for civic action in all three and their similarities, and 
the different ways in which the pandemic played out in these 
contexts. Section 4 delves deeper into various ways that 
civic space has changed over the course of the year. Section 5 
turns the lens on the civic action that arose or persisted as 
the space was changing – for the most part, closing. 
The report is our evidence-based contribution to a 
multitudinous global conversation about how civil 
society organisations (CSOs) and active citizens can best 
strategise, act and navigate the turbulent dynamics we 
and many others are observing. Our data, generated 
from the ground up over this intensive six-month 
process spanning the first peak of the global pandemic, 
adds to the existing debates illustration, granularity 
and corroboration of a global phenomenon with far-
reaching, troubling consequences for democracy. It is 
addressed to advocates of democracy in both scholarly 
and activist roles who have focused on what is happening 
to civil society over recent decades, and to aid donors 
– official, philanthropy and non-governmental – who 
support democratisation and civil society, in the hopes of 
informing our collective strategies and actions. 
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1.2 The research process
Navigating Civic Space in a Time of Covid-19 
was a research project created under the Action 
for Empowerment and Accountability (A4EA) 
research programme in early 2020, working with 
research teams in three of the A4EA focus countries: 
Mozambique, Nigeria, and Pakistan. The project 
design was methodologically innovative, based on 
a monthly research cycle intended to capture events 
and changes in civic space and civic action in real time 
and to understand these from the perspectives of 
civil society actors. Observatory panels of civil society 
leaders were established and met monthly in each 
country from June – December 2020, after the first 
waves of cases and lockdown measures, and through to 
the start, in most cases, of a second wave of infections. 
Effectively, these functioned as three recurrent 
focus groups, amassing qualitative panel data in fast-
changing, and at times risky contexts. Together panel 
members reflected on the situation on the ground for 
the work they were trying to do, and commented on 
broader events, debates, and incidents. Relevant events 
were systematically catalogued by lead researchers 
based on a continual scan of traditional and social 
media. These ‘event catalogues’ provided content 
for debate in panel discussions, and provided a rich 
evidence base for a wide set of actions and patternsb. 
Panels had up to 10 members, representing different 
geographies and sectors. The members remained 
consistent throughout the project, allowing them 
to build relationships and continue a conversation 
together as the pandemic and policy responses 
played out. In some cases, panel members decided 
to continue collaborative analysis and advocacy work 
after the project finished. The panels met virtually 
using videoconferencing platforms, which meant that 
they could take place even during lockdown periods.
As a research team we mirrored this process at a cross-
country level: meeting monthly to digest and collectively 
analyse the discussions in each country observatory 
panel, finding commonalities and differences, and 
placing these against a monthly update on events in 
other countries or commentary from other studies. 
These layered discussions surfaced leads and insights 
that we fed back to the country observatory panels as 
themes for further discussion, and to be explored further 
in key informant interviews or ‘guest appearances’ of 
key figures holding dialogues with observatory panel 
members. Key informants were carefully selected to 
provide harder-to-reach perspectives, help ground-truth 
the other data, or fill in important gaps. Findings were 
compiled in reports for each country, complementing 
baseline studies completed by each country research 
team at the start of the project.
In a research process characterised by solidarity and 
mutuality, this approach privileged the voices of activists 
and organisers on the frontlines, valued their expertise and 
allowed us to bring together findings grounded in their 
particular priorities, surface cross-country patterns as they 
emerged, and place these in the context of a wider set 
of patterns from the global commentary on these issues. 
b The event catalogue in Nigeria ran alongside the ongoing documentation maintained in the Closing Spaces Database by our 
Nigeria research partner, Spaces for Change.
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Figure 1. Our research process
 • Baseline studies: Understanding the recent trends 
in each country
 • Event tracking: Media and social media 
scanning to identify relevant events and 
debates, fed into observatory panels
 • Observatory panels: Around 10 civil society 
leaders in each country debating key themes 
and issues of the day each month
 • Key informant interviews: Targeted interviews 
with civil society members and activists 
 • Global scanning: Summaries of new research and 
commentary on the pandemic, governance, and 
civic space, fed into monthly synthesis discussions
 • Cross-country synthesis: Monthly dialogue on 
discussions in observatory panels, and patterns of 



















1.3 Civic space pre-pandemic: 
Civic energy amidst shrinking 
space for dissent
Commentators have been observing significant 
changes in civic space in countries around 
the world for several years now. Rising 
authoritarianism and autocratic ways of governing 
have put many civil society actors under 
significant pressure and eroded fundamental 
rights of association, assembly, and expression. 
Prior to the Covid-19 pandemic CIVICUS reported 
that 67 per cent of the world’s population lived 
in countries where civic space was closed or 
repressed4. Freedom House declared that 2019 
was the fourteenth consecutive year of decline in 
global freedom and that ‘democracy and pluralism 
are under assault’5. The 2021 V-Dem Democracy 
Report, entitled ‘Autocratization Turns Viral’, 
further documents these trends. According to this 
report, 68 per cent of the global population now 
live in autocracies, of which ‘electoral autocracies’ 
are most common6. These are regimes which 
fall short of democratic standards because of 
institutional weaknesses or limits on political 
competition, although they hold multiparty 
elections7. Hybrid regimes of this kind, where 
elements of democratic and undemocratic rule 
sit side by side8, are the reality for most people in 
the world.
In this paper we understand civic space broadly as 
the physical, virtual and legal place where people 
associate, express themselves and assemble. Civil 
society of course includes conservative, socially 
regressive and pro-government elements, as 
well as progressive critics of government. But we 
are specifically interested in how far the space 
available allows civil society actors to advocate 
for rights, express dissent or opposition, and 
contribute to public deliberation without, as 
Hossain and Khurana put it, ‘fear of incurring 
official disapproval, hostility, violence or abuse, 
or without breaking laws or regulations’9. 
Sustaining more open civic space is fundamental 
to equitable and democratic dialogue, embracing 
pluralism and inclusion of the historically 
marginalised, and allowing people to realise 
fundamental rights to associate and speak freely. 
A United Nations Guidance Note from September 
2020 pointedly notes that these freedoms and 
rights are especially important in times of crisis, 
and that when they are impaired this is often 
an early warning sign of further human rights 
violations.10 In addition, Hossain and colleagues 
make the developmental case that open civic 
space and the plurality it brings are central to 
the Sustainable Development Goals, arguing that 
progress on reducing inequalities is impaired 
when civil society groups can no longer empower 
and protect the poor and marginalised.11
There is a substantial literature evidencing a wave 
of actions that have closed civic space across 
diverse contexts in the past decades.12 Box 1 sets 
out the numerous forms they have taken. These 
actions are very often targeted at particular civic 
actors or organisations. Whilst some measures, like 
rules for CSO registration, might appear to apply 
to everyone, the space that different organisations 
and actors have available is far from uniform, and 
such rules are often applied arbitrarily. Based on 
country case studies, Hossain et al. argue that 
rather than an all-out closure in civic space what 
has been observed are selective and strategic 
changes that close down opportunities for those 
critical of governments and elites, including 
business elites.13 This finding chimes with those 
of Borgh and Terwindt, who show that the space 
available depends in part on the activities that 
CSOs pursue – with ‘service-oriented’ organisations 
having considerably more space under regimes 
that allow advocacy and rights-based organisations 
to be persecuted and closed down.14 Buyse 
notes the important role here of discourse that 
delegitimises ‘political’ actions by CSOs, advancing 
a narrative that sees civic organisations as primarily 
service providers.15
At the same time as these attacks, and often in the 
same places, many have noted a surge in civic 
energy and ‘people power’. Maerz et al. argue that 
pro-democracy mass mobilisation was at an all-time 
high in 2019, and ‘contributed to substantial 
democratization in 22 countries over the last ten 
years’.16 Others reflected too on 2019 as ‘the year of 
protest’, noting mobilisations around economic 
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It is in times of crisis that civic space, 
transparency and the free flow of information 
are more critical than ever for building and 
maintaining the trust needed for effective 
responses.
– UN Guidance Note on Civic Space, September 2020
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crises as well as political leadership.17 Brannen et al. 
consider us in ‘an age of global mass protests that 
are historically unprecedented in frequency, scope, 
and size’.18 Chenoweth contrasts the rise in non-
violent resistance with the decline in violent or 
armed campaigns since the 1970s, but also argues 
that in recent years – despite some clear wins by 
popular movements in a number of countries – 
non-violent resistance has become less effective, 
partly as states have adapted their strategies to 
nullify or appease protests.19 Youngs argues that 
not only have the frequency and intensity of citizen 
campaigns and mobilisation increased since 
the turn of the 21st century, but that these have 
taken on new characters, strategies and tactics.20 
He identifies a rise in movement-style politics 
and direct-action that corresponds with others’ 
views of resurging popular mobilisation and 
protest, with rapid growth of online space 
providing new avenues for solidarity and 
transnational connections. 
Whilst public protest and mass mobilisation 
depend on a degree of civic space, the hybrid 
political systems in much of the world mean that 
this surge of civic energy is not limited at all to 
more open or democratic places. The Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace Protest 
Tracker finds that anti-government protests 
of significant scale happened in 78 per cent of 
‘authoritarian or authoritarian-leaning’ countries 
since 2017.21Nor do decades of increasing pressure 
on CSOs mean that they are out of the picture 
in these contexts. Instead, as often before under 
military or authoritarian rule, CSOs and activists 
adopt strategies to navigate the space available, 
minimise the risks they face, and take what 
opportunities they can. They might actively counter 
restrictions, for example mobilising people and 
international organisations or foreign governments 
in support. They might find ways to circumvent 
new restrictions to continue their activities. Or 
they may choose to weather the attacks in the 
hope of greater openness down the line. A review 
by the Norwegian development agency NORAD in 
2018 distinguished between pro-active responses 
that sought to (re)claim spaces to operate and 
legitimacy, and reactive responses. Reactive 
responses they observed included self-censorship, 
shifting work towards service delivery, working 
in relatively more open sub-national areas, and 
challenging de-legitimising discourses.22 El Assal 
and Marzouk trace similar strategies of human 
rights organisation in Egypt in the crackdown 
that followed the Arab Spring, but also choices 
to relocate organisations outside of the country, 
cut ties with foreign donors and re-orientate to 
‘membership models’ to secure funds.23
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Box 1
Attacks on civic space take various forms and include24:
• Formal and legal restrictions and 
regulations on organisations, including 
the legal right of civic organisations to 
exist, curtailments on their income and 
activities, and supervision by the state
• Restrictions in freedom of speech and 
press freedom
• Restrictions in access to information 
and communication, notably through 
regulation and policing of digital and 
online space
• Targeting of activists and activist civil 
society organisations for individual 
harassment, persecution or violence, 
including malicious prosecution and 
selective assassination
• Tactics that divide and fragment civil 
society groups and campaigners
• Co-optation of CSOs by state or other 
actors, reducing their independence
• Anti-CSO discourses, negative labelling, 
and stigmatisation 
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1.4 The shock of the pandemic: 
Openings and closures 
An emergency heightens society’s need to be 
governed. Protecting and restoring public health 
in a pandemic requires complex and restrictive 
regulation. Responding to crisis strains the social 
contract and tests states’ and governments’ 
systems for governing the collective and public 
goods. Covid-19 triggered a rash of policy measures 
that restricted civic freedoms in the name of public 
health, with similar policy responses spreading 
quickly across countries with diverse needs and 
exposure to the virus. 
These policy measures and the actions of authorities 
were fast brought into focus by watchers of civic 
space and democratic standards, with numerous 
projects mobilising or pivoting to monitor newly 
restrictive changes in laws and governance practices 
worldwidec. The evidence and commentary that 
resulted shows a surge in autocratic behaviour 
and decline in democratic freedoms.25 Whilst 
public health measures were undoubtedly needed, 
the threat of a global pandemic was used to 
implement emergency measures without time 
limits, curtail democratic freedoms and put critics 
behind bars in many countries.26 Many have argued 
that governments used the public health crisis to 
become increasingly authoritarian.27 V-DEM, which 
launched a project on ‘pandemic backsliding’ on 
democracy and tracked violations of democratic 
norms across the year, observed that 55 autocratic 
regimes engaged in major or moderate violations of 
international norms28. 
The pandemic response resulted in a global decline 
in the three freedoms that are integral to civic 
space – freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of 
expression, and freedom of association. Freedom 
of peaceful assembly was the most affected due to 
the nature of the virus which required people to 
maintain social distance, and the widespread use 
of stay-at-home or lockdown orders29. Information 
and its accuracy took on new currency and became 
more contested in the face of an unknown virus 
and its rapid spread, leading to many measures 
curtailing freedom of expression. This ‘infodemic’30 
provided ample space for governments to pass 
new laws concerning fake news which in practice 
were used to curb dissent31, and use other laws, 
for example on sedition, to silence critics of 
pandemic responses32. Freedom of association 
was undermined through increased regulation of 
CSOs, particularly in relation to foreign funding, 
during the pandemic33. Online space acquired 
increasing relevance during the pandemic given 
the restrictions on physical assembly, building on 
the pre-pandemic trends noted above34. Activists 
used digital media to organise themselves, spread 
information, show solidarity and share resources 
in new ways. However as civic actors increasingly 
relied on online spaces, governments began 
closing these spaces35. Various governments used 
contact tracing apps to increase surveillance, 
social media groups to censor narratives, and 
internet shutdowns to limit communication36. 
Section 3 illustrates how these trends played out in 
Mozambique, Nigeria, and Pakistan. 
At the same time, we also see emerging forms 
of agency and civic action in response to the 
crisis, and newly important issues, actors, and 
repertoires. The areas of policy and of life that 
gained prominence as focuses of activism were 
those that were most acutely affected either 
by the pandemic itself or by policy responses 
to it. Mutual aid groups, community-based 
organisations, and informal networks came to 
the fore37. Emergent repertoires included use of 
digital spaces, online-offline protests, people-less 
protests and new coalitions38. New opportunities 
presented themselves for civic actors to work 
on issues of service delivery, spreading accurate 
information working in new coalitions, including 
with government actors. All of these developments 
provided signs of how civic groups’ navigation 
of the pandemic might enable them to continue 
surviving in the context of closing civic space, a 
subject we return to in Section 4.
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c See for example the V-Dem monitor of ‘Pandemic Backsliding’, the International Press Institute Covid-19 Press Freedom tracker, 
the International Centre for Non-profit Law COVID-19 Civic Freedom Tracker, and the Transparency and Accountability Initiative’s 
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Mozambique, Nigeria, and Pakistan: 
Governance, civic space, and the 
unfolding of the pandemic
Mozambique, Nigeria, and Pakistan offer prime examples of the global trend 
that has been seen over the last decade towards increased authoritarianism 
and closing of civic space. The three countries also share histories of post-
colonial military and single-party rule, legacies of violence and continued 
internal conflicts and security threats, a high degree of poverty and other 
human development needs, and weak forms of voice and accountability. 
Despite these challenges, each country also has a history of civic activism, 
which grew following the creation of spaces for democratisation in their 
respective constitutions. In more recent years, however these spaces have 
come under renewed pressure with both formal and informal attacks. The 
pandemic played out differently in each. While official case and death rates 
were by far the most severe in Pakistan, similarly rapid and drastic policy 
responses were seen in all countries, accompanied by similar narratives 
and attitudes. In each country the shock of the pandemic coincided with 
other major events, including natural disasters, economic crises, and 
resurgences of violence and sub-national conflict. The pandemic context 
both exacerbated the shocks’ effects and shaped the ensuing civic action. 
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2.1 The governance contexts 
Mozambique, Nigeria, and Pakistan illustrate 
the global trends highlighted above. Rather than 
exceptions to an otherwise democratic world 
they reflect situations that are more common 
than not. While they do not represent the most 
‘closed’ or autocratic settings, neither are they the 
most open. All three were classified by the V-Dem 
Global Democracy Report as ‘electoral autocracies’ 
in 201939, and as ‘hybrid’ regimes by the EIU 
Democracy Index40. According to the Civicus Monitor 
on Civic Space, all three countries had ‘repressed’ or 
‘obstructed’ civic space prior to the pandemic41. 
The countries share other characteristics in addition 
to these broad indicators of democracy, which have 
long affected the nature of citizen-state relations42. 
Perhaps the most important of these is that they 
share histories of military rule, and memories 
of the repressive power of the military remain 
strong. Following independence from their colonial 
powers, both Nigeria and Pakistan have experienced 
intermittent military governments, up until 1999 in 
the case of Nigeria, and as late as 2007 in the case 
of Pakistan. In Mozambique, the dominant party, 
Frelimo, has been in power since 1975, and with that 
power has come the consolidation of control over 
the security apparatus. 
Closely aligned to the history of military power, and 
dominant-party control of the security apparatus, 
these countries also share legacies of conflict and 
violence involving resource-rich but historically 
marginalised regions. Following independence, 
Mozambique experienced civil war up until 1992. 
Currently, security concerns continue with the 
increased violence linked to a jihadi insurgency 
in the northern Cabo Delgado region, as well as a 
renewal of conflict with a breakaway military branch 
of Renamo, the main opposition party, in Manica 
and Sofala provinces. Nigeria similarly faces the rise 
of the Islamist Boko Haram in the north, as well as 
ongoing conflicts amongst religious and ethnic groups, 
longstanding unrest over oil extraction in the Delta 
and a resurgence of pro-Biafra groups following its 
own civil war over fifty years ago. Pakistan faces 
conflicts related to Taliban insurgency in Khyber 
Pakhtoonkhwa (KP) and nationalist insurgency in 
Balochistan provinces. All three countries are regarded 
as ‘highly fragile’ in terms of security and either 
‘severe’ or ‘high’ in terms of societal fragility43. Yet 
they are not fragile states in terms of their repressive 
power. As we shall see, in such settings ‘national 
security’ or ‘anti-terrorism’ can be invoked to suppress 
dissent and close civic space, and with the historically 
central roles of the military and secret police in these 
countries, these threats cannot be taken lightly. 
It is also important to note that these are low 
income and highly unequal countries, where 
livelihoods and access to basic services such as 
health and education remain a daily struggle for 
vast numbers. Each of these countries sit at the 
extremely low end of the Human Development 
Index (2020)d. Nor is there great confidence in the 
government’s abilities to deliver on these needs for 
basic services, as these countries also rank relatively 
high in terms of perceived corruption, with high 
levels of mistrust of the state44. Even before the 
pandemic crisis, there were huge unmet needs and 
vulnerabilities within the population – which would 
continue to worsen when the pandemic began. 
2.2 Civic space before the 
pandemic
Despite the challenging settings described above, 
each of these countries has a vibrant civil society 
and, to varying degrees, a history of informal protest 
and contention towards the regime. Pakistan, for 
instance, has over 45,000 registered non-profit 
organisations, and while the government favours 
those that focus on service delivery or humanitarian 
relief, many organisations have historically managed 
to work on more contentious issues of gender 
justice, human rights, and democratic politics. At 
key moments in history, mobilisations and protests 
have protected civic space or challenged government 
actions. Nigeria, similarly, has a large number and 
range of organised NGOs, as well as dense networks 
of more informal community-based organisations, 
faith-based groups, professional associations, trade 
unions, and others. Over 90,000 registered non-profit 
entities form a very important part of Nigeria’s civil 
society sector, with their activities reaching millions 
of people45. Here, too, civic action is common, 
and the last decade has seen protest activity on 
the rise, with over 600 public protests recorded in 
2019, an over 600 per cent increase from 201046. 
In Mozambique, with its strong single party rule, 
civic space has historically been curtailed, and often 
dominated by party-affiliated mass membership 
organisations. In general, civic organisations here 
are more donor-driven, less established and less 
d In the Human Development Index, which is a composite index of health, education, standard of living and other factors, Mozambique 
ranked 181st out of 189 countries globally, Nigeria 161st, and Pakistan 154th in 2019.
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autonomous from government than in the other two 
countries. Yet even here, since the 1990s CSOs have 
grown in number and type, and taken space to work 
on issues of rights and good governance.
Of course, in more autocratic regimes, this civic history 
does not necessarily translate into greater voice 
and accountability. Even before the pandemic, each 
of these countries was already seeing a tightening 
of civic space and activity, with growing pressure 
particularly against CSOs, media, or activists who 
challenged government or worked on governance-
related issues directly. The three countries rank low 
(Mozambique and Nigeria) or very low (Pakistan) and 
are on a downwards trend in the World Governance 
Indicators for Voice and Accountability47. 
Many mechanisms contributed to this constricting 
of space, both formal and informal. Our baseline 
reviews of civic space before the pandemic pointed 
to the significance of legislative restrictions on 
CSOs, and tightening of online space (see Boxes 2 
and 3), where legislation and regulation has actively 
reduced civic space or provided the tools to pursue 
critics. They also pointed to increasing pressure 
on press freedom, whether formally or through 
attacks and silencing tactics (see Box 4). Restrictions 
such as these interact with other more informal 
social and political pressures to silence or threaten 
dissenting voices. In both Nigeria and Pakistan, with 
deep religious divisions and growing fundamentalist 
movements, anti-blasphemy laws have been used to 
attack religious minorities or human rights activists. 
Groups may be stigmatised or attacked as anti-
Islam, pro-Western, terrorist, or threats to national 
security as pretexts to silence them. And in contexts 
with such histories of violence and repression, 
such threats may get put into practice through 
forced disappearances or abductions of journalists 
or activists. Examples of these actions, arbitrary 
arrests, and malicious prosecution of government 
critics exist in all three countries. In Pakistan official 
statistics recorded over two thousand pending cases 
of forced disappearances at the end of 201948. 
In each of these contexts, pressures or funding 
from international donors have historically been 
important for keeping democratic space open, or 
for supporting the work of human rights or pro-
democracy groups. For example, in Pakistan other 
A4EA research49 has established how important 
international support for feminist activism and 
campaigning has been. However, increasing controls 
over financial flows, as well as anti-Western 
sentiments, have arguably limited the supportive 
role that even outside donors could play. 
Box 2
Restrictive legislation
Although all three countries have constitutions 
that provide for civic freedoms, they have also, 
like so many around the world, seen the growth 
of regulations and rules which pose new hurdles 
for CSOs to register, receive funding and carry out 
their activities. 
In Nigeria these include the NGO Regulatory Bill 
2016 and Civil Society Regulatory Commission Bill 
2020, various state level bills regulating NGOs, and 
other restrictions on financial flows, such as the 
National Risk Assessment Bill 2016. 
In Pakistan, such moves have included the registration 
of all foreign-funded NGOs since 2015, registration 
of domestic NGOs with the Economic Affairs Division 
of government, and new Charity Commissions 
at provincial level that started to be established 
in 2018, as well as the use of ‘No Objection 
Certificates’ to gain approval for individual activities. 
Restrictive legislation has been on the books in 
Mozambique for several years, although had not 
passed into law by the time of the outbreak of 
the pandemic. A new press law, however, has 
been widely criticised for restricting the freedom 
of operation of non-state media, reversing 
the tendency of previous decades when much 
progressive legislation (including on freedom of 
information) had been passed. 
While such legislation in and of itself may not be 
restrictive, it has been seen to be used selectively, 
especially for instance in Pakistan against Western 
organisations who are accused of anti-Islamist 
values, or in Nigeria, against groups which officials 
may falsely claim are supporting terrorism, as 
seen in the closure of the Action Against Hunger 
offices, a charity based in Borno and Yoruba 
states.
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2.3 When the pandemic struck: 
Cases, policies, and narratives 
Mozambique, Nigeria, and Pakistan were hit 
quite differently, and at different points as the 
pandemic spread in early 2020 (see Boxes 5, 6, 
and 7)e. None reached the degree of transmission 
or fatality of the most-affected countries globally, 
or in the case of Mozambique and Pakistan even 
their near neighbours, although the extent of 
population testing and data quality issues almost 
certainly led to underestimates in these official 
reports. As Figures 2 and 3 on page 20 show, 
Pakistan saw the greatest reported health impact 
of the pandemic by the end of 2020.
However, the global call to action from the World 
Health Organisation, scenes of overwhelmed 
hospitals in Western Europe, and rapid 
transnational diffusion of public policies seen 
as necessary to control the pandemic brought 
Box 3
Tightening of online space
In each country the internet has become 
an increasing source of communication and 
mobilisation by activists and civil society, 
especially perhaps as the restrictions in the 
offline spaces increased. Yet this area too has 
seen increased restrictions, in common with 
global trends. Pakistan is regarded as ‘not 
free’ and Nigeria ‘partly free’ in the Freedom 
House ‘Freedom on the Net’ index in 2020 . In 
Nigeria legislation was passed in 2015 and 2019 
to regulate social media and online speech, 
and allow prosecutions for statements and 
actions online. In Pakistan, the Prevention of 
Electronic Crimes Act 2016 (PECA) and Citizens 
Protection (Against Online Harm) Rules 2020 
have empowered authorities to pursue activists 
and target commonly used platforms. The new 
press law in Mozambique included provision to 
regulate online journalism and online speech. 
These rules have been used selectively to target 
bloggers or citizen activists for ‘cybercrimes’ or 
messages that are regarded as hate speech or 
blasphemy, and there are growing concerns on 
the use of these to stifle dissent and free speech. 
Such attacks to the online space are not only 
through regulation. In Mozambique pro-Frelimo 
‘trolls’ have become increasingly active in recent 
years, with a rising number of online attacks and 
threats against civil society leaders, journalists 
and opposition activists.
Box 4
Limiting of media and press freedom 
Each country has an active press, yet each 
also ranks relatively low on the Press Freedom 
Index, ranging from Mozambique at 104th (out 
of 180 countries), Nigeria, 115th and Pakistan, 
145th. In some cases there have been highly 
visible attacks on journalists who challenged 
government corruption publicly, or the closure 
of media offices. In Mozambique these include 
the attacks on well-known media commentators 
Erico de Salema and José Jaime Macuane, 
and the murder in 2015 of constitutional law 
professor Gilles Cistac after a media interview 
in which he expressed agreement with a 
decentralisation proposal that was in line 
with what the opposition Renamo movement 
was advocating.
e All commentary on reported case numbers in this section uses information from Our World In Data. Case numbers are as reported 
by John Hopkins University.
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about significant changes in each country from 
March onwards. In each country these policy 
responses included states of emergency or 
exceptional restrictions on individual freedoms, 
changes to health services, economic stimulus or 
protection, and relief or aid to those vulnerable 
to the shocks of the pandemic.
As well as similar policy responses there were 
similarities in narratives and discourse around 
the pandemic in all three countries, resonating 
with framings elsewhere. Most notably the 
initial transmission through cross-border and 
internal travel led to characterisations of the 
disease as imported. In Mozambique and 
Nigeria this was linked to foreigners and political 
and business elites travelling internationally. 
In Pakistan Shia Muslims returning from 
pilgrimages from high-prevalence Iran, and 
cross-border traders were vilified for carrying 
the virus. Where case transmission was slow to 
take off but severe social and economic limitations 
were imposed, rumours of the virus being a hoax, 
or less dangerous for non-Western countries, 
spread widely. As in many countries, concerns 
that the harm caused by closing down economic 
activity would out-scale the harms of the virus 
were commonplace. 
Figure 2. Cumulative confirmed Covid-19 cases 
per 1 million population (31/12/20)
Figure 3. Total reported Covid-19 related deaths 
per 1 million population (31/12/20)
Box 5
Mozambique
Mozambique had its first officially recorded case a few 
days after the pandemic declaration. The government 
responded with immediate border closures, closures 
of schools and bans on large gatherings, as cases 
rose in neighbouring South Africa. Shortly afterwards 
further restrictions on gatherings and business 
opening were announced. Reported cases remained 
low for several months, with the first Covid-related 
death reported at the end of May, and cases beginning 
to rise in early June. That increase continued slowly 
but steadily, overtaking the prevalence of the virus 
in Nigeria in early August and peaking first in early 
September. Restrictions were gradually lifted after 
this peak, as the rate of infection slowed, although the 
number of positive tests soared in January, potentially 
linked to the spread of the highly contagious South 
African variant as a result of Mozambican mine 
workers returning home from South Africa for the 
















Mozambique Nigeria Pakistan World
Source: Our World in Data, data from COVID-19 Data Repository by the Center for Systems Science and Engineering (CSSE) at Johns Hopkins University.
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Nigeria reported the earliest first case of the virus of 
the three countries, but official statistics show only 
a slow increase in new cases in the early months of 
the pandemic. Nevertheless, the Nigerian authorities 
responded with significant and far-reaching 
policy responses, often ‘borrowed’ or imported 
from countries far harder hit and where health 
systems were being overwhelmed with patients. 
These included ‘stay-at-home’ lockdown orders 
and curfew restrictions targeted in areas of greatest 
infection, bans on travel, and closure of schools and 
businesses. In March an economic stimulus package 
was announced, although only for the formal 
economy, and in early April emergency payments 
to poor and vulnerable households on the National 
Social Register. After a peak in early July, newly 
reported cases levelled out at relatively low rates 
from September to December. A second wave of new 
cases took off in December, with the Nigerian Center 
for Disease Control issuing a new advisory notice and 
government ordering the re-opening of Covid-19 
isolation and treatment centres previously closed.
Box 7
Pakistan
Pakistan experienced the most pronounced and 
immediate ‘first wave’, with newly identified cases 
rising rapidly from March until a peak in mid-June, 
reporting the highest number of daily new cases 
in the world on 13 June (6,825). World Health 
Organisation data identified Pakistan as the second 
hardest hit country in South Asia and with the 
fourteenth highest global case count at this point. 
Newly reported cases declined steeply between 
June and September, and the government was 
praised for its achievements, although some, 
including the Pakistan Medical Association, raised 
concerns about a lack of testing taking place51. 
During this period the government rolled out an 
Ehsaas emergency cash transfer scheme, which 
delivered USD1.1 billion to 14.8 million families 
at risk of extreme poverty52. The public health 
responses of ‘smart lockdowns’, curfews, bans on 
gatherings, closures of schools and universities, 
restaurants and some businesses were gradually 
lifted. Newly reported cases started to rise, at first 
slowly, and from late October rapidly, in a second 
wave that peaked in early December following the 
reintroduction of many restrictions. 
2.4 A year of intersecting crises
In all three countries the shock of the pandemic 
coincided with other major events, including some 
that overtook the virus in public priority. These 
included continuation and flare-ups of long-standing 
conflicts, natural disasters, economic crises, and 
varieties of political tension. When the Mo Ibrahim 
Foundation published a report in August53 on 
the views of young Africans on the pandemic its 
conclusion that the health effects of Covid-19 were 
dwarfed by other social and economic concerns, 
including those caused by pandemic responses, 
chimed with our cross-country research panel.
In Northern and Central Mozambique, still 
struggling to recover from two severe cyclones 
which struck those regions in 2019, conflicts 
escalated over the course of 2020. The observatory 
panel in Mozambique included representatives 
from Cabo Delgado, where a jihadi insurgency that 
began in the coastal district of Mocímboa da Praia in 
2017 rapidly engulfed most of the province, raising 
fears that it could spread into other provinces. They 
were clear throughout the research that conflict 
posed a far greater risk than Covid-19, and that civil 
society groups were more concerned about how 
the state of emergency closed down their space 
to provide humanitarian relief and document the 
actions of armed groups on the ground. Conflicts 
persisted too in Nigeria and Pakistan, raising similar 
concerns about civil society’s ability to intervene, 
provide aid, and call for accountability. In August 
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a flare-up of violence in South Kaduna, Nigeria 
led to displacement, deaths, and economic crisis 
in this already conflict-affected area.54 In Pakistan 
insurgency and military activity continued in 
Balochistan, and conflict persisted in Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa, where civic space and freedoms 
were already significantly constrained according 
to activists on the ground.55 Early in the pandemic 
cases of Covid-19 in Mozambique and Pakistan 
were reported by our researchers to be higher in 
these areas of conflict, and Kaduna State became 
one of centres of the second wave in Nigeria. 
Other crises overlayed this background of conflict 
and emergency response to the pandemic. In 
Pakistan severe rains in August caused floods, 
widespread destruction and deaths.56 Emergency 
relief by civil society groups and authorities 
overtook the pandemic in priority, and citizens 
challenged public health measures and instructions 
by protesting over the government’s response. As 
debates were going on across the world on access 
to relief funds and social protection in the wake 
of the pandemic, people in the central region of 
Mozambique were still demanding relief funds 
promised in the wake of Cyclone Idai in early 2019.57 
As the pandemic wore on the global economic 
effects gained more prominence. In Nigeria, the 
heavy economic dependence on oil caused a severe 
economic shock as the pandemic led oil demand 
and prices to drop, impacting public finances 
hugely.58 Stay-at-home orders also greatly affected 
agricultural production. Immediately after lockdown 
measures were lifted students took to the streets to 
protest over increases in electricity and fuel prices.59 
In Pakistan, the combination of lockdown impacts 
on the informal economy, soaring inflation and 
rupee devaluation meant that the lowest paid were 
struggling on significant real-terms cuts in their 
income. The deteriorating global market for natural 
gas combined with the growing insurgency in Cabo 
Delgado (site of Mozambique’s largest gas fields) 
led several global energy companies to cancel or 
postpone their investments in the Mozambican 
gas sector, devastating the government’s revenue 
outlook and increasing popular frustration after 
many years of raised expectations.
Other forms of political crisis and contestation 
continued throughout the pandemic. In Mozambique 
government transparency and accountability around 
the use of new oil and gas revenues became a central 
point of contention, notably in calls to create and 
transparently manage a sovereign fund. In Pakistan 
opposition parties came together in coalition 
towards the end of the year to attempt a unified 
front against the governing party (Pakistan Tehreek-
e-Insaf - PTI) and the ‘militablishment’, and actions 
by the banned PTM movement continued. In Nigeria 
long-standing grievances on corruption, and poor 
governance, and police brutality fuelled a number 
of protests against the government with calls for 
accountability, most notably in the EndSARS protests 
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against the spread 





Civic space during the pandemic
The pandemic hastened and magnified previous trends of civic space 
closure in Mozambique, Nigeria, and Pakistan, both offline and online. 
The crisis gave cover and impetus for further repression and attacks 
by authorities, intensifying the rejection of critical voices. Space was 
not only closed further for critics of government, but forces of division 
grew, riding on the stigmatisation of others, internal conflicts, and 
competition for resources. 
3
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A key feature of the global commentary on Covid-19 and governance is the opportunity and impetus it gave for authoritarian and autocratic moves by 
governments and political elites. Faced with a 
crisis with many unknowns and pressure for rapid 
action, emergency powers were taken quickly by 
authorities in Mozambique, Nigeria, and Pakistan. 
A wave of restrictions on daily life followed. 
However justified on public health grounds, 
these restrictions were widely abused. The 
‘securitisation’ response spawned numerous rights 
issues, with police and security services particularly 
guilty of over-reach and opportunism. Rules were 
not only over-enforced, but enforced selectively 
to target dissent and critique of government’s 
pandemic response and the social and economic 
fall-out each country experienced. Previous 
patterns of seeking to regulate the CSOs that ask 
difficult questions, and vilify and harass individual 
activists, continued unabated despite the public 
policy priority of pandemic relief and alleviation. 
Beyond the most obvious restrictions on freedom 
of assembly, human rights abuses and examples 
of state over-reach during the pandemic, more 
insidious attacks on civic freedoms continued. 
Press freedom was consistently under attack, 
with reporting restrictions imposed on the 
pandemic and policy responses, as well as 
ongoing conflicts and popular protest. Critical 
journalists were threatened, harassed, subject 
to malicious investigation and prosecution, and 
in some instances ‘disappeared’. ‘Fake news’ 
narratives were used to undermine their reporting 
alongside widespread disinformation campaigns by 
authorities and their allies. 
Moves to control the debate and silence critical 
voices applied as much online as offline. As 
physical gatherings were restricted and unviable 
much civic action moved online, with some 
seeing a new era of ‘digitivism’ that broadened 
and amplified activist’s voices and concerns. But 
attempts to undermine these spaces kept pace. 
Online harassment became an even greater issue. 
Authorities moved to regulate online speech 
and commonly used platforms, claiming this was 
to combat ‘cybercrime’ threats, ‘fake news’ or 
‘immoral’, ‘divisive’ or ‘anti-patriotic’ content. 
In this highly charged atmosphere freedom of 
expression online paid the price, with our panellists 
reflecting on growing mistrust of information, and 
self-censorship by activists. 
Alongside attacks on civic freedoms and space 
and intensified restrictions on CSOs, the pandemic 
exacerbated sources of division amongst civil 
society, and sometimes diverted civic energy along 
these lines. Long-standing social divisions and 
tensions were inflamed both by the pandemic and 
the response – whether in the stigmatisation of 
particular communities as ‘carriers’ of the virus, 
the selective application of rules to some identity 
groups but not others, or perceived discrimination 
in relief and aid. Sectarian divisions grew deeper, 
with accusations of blasphemy being ‘weaponised’ 
more than ever in Nigeria and Pakistan to silence 
critics and sustain grievances.
Tensions and divisions also played out between 
different areas in each country, and between central 
and sub-national authorities. The centralising effect 
of executive powers led to disputes with sub-national 
governance structures over pandemic management, 
differing rules, and allocation of resources. These 
overlaid the effects of ongoing conflict and natural 
disasters experienced in distinct parts of each 
country. For CSOs, whilst new opportunities for 
joined-up action presented themselves, there 
were also signs of fissures in relationships between 
national and urban-based organisations and those 
more rural and community-based. 
Finally, the re-direction of public and international 
donor funds towards pandemic response provided 
important opportunities but also threatened to 
be divisive. Alongside many positive examples of 
new collaborations between civil society actors in 
the emergency context of the pandemic, explored 
in the next section, competition for new and 
dwindling funds on ‘old’ priorities threatened the 
solidarity of the CSOs. Such competition – framed 
by one panel as CSOs ‘shrinking their own space’ – 
sat alongside decisions by authorities and funders 
to channel resources through less contentious and 
service oriented civic organisations. 
3.1 Executive over-reach, 
securitisation and suppression 
of dissent
In common with many countries around the 
world, the pandemic triggered emergency 
legislation and ‘lockdown’ restrictions on public 
gathering, travel, education, and business in all 
three countries. On 30 March, the President of 
Mozambique addressed the nation and declared a 
State of Emergency ‘for reasons of public calamity’ 
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for the first time in the nation’s democratic 
history. On the same day in Nigeria the federal 
government signed Covid Regulations I, giving 
legal backing to lockdown restrictions already in 
place in Lagos, Ogun, and Abuja since 21 March. 
Simultaneously the province of Sindh in Pakistan 
initiated its first full lockdown, closely followed by 
the provinces of Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
(KP) and Punjab. Pakistan also closed its border 
with Afghanistan and Iran, and held four thousand 
returnees from Iran in enforced quarantine.60 
In all countries this represented a significant shift 
towards executive authority, with the threat of the 
pandemic triggering a firmly centralised approach 
that avoided well-established processes for public 
deliberation and participation. In Nigeria usual 
measures for triggering oversight of new legislation, 
requiring consultation and public and parliamentary 
debate, were avoided. In Pakistan a new body, the 
National Command Operation Centre was created 
to oversee the pandemic response, chaired by the 
Minister of Defence and involving several military 
representatives.61 The Pakistan observatory panel 
participants who saw this as the start of a ‘clawback 
mode’ from the military, seeking to regain some of 
the political power gradually devolved to provinces 
and the elected government, noted how the 
government issued regulations and actively avoided 
legislation to prevent parliamentary debate. In 
Mozambique, our panel saw the State of Emergency 
as significantly ‘exaggerated’ and violating fundamental 
rights, also noting that it was effectively extended 
beyond constitutional provisions through the 
passing of a new law in August.
Lockdown restrictions gave new space for ‘over-
reach’ from authorities, and in particular police 
and security forces. Lack of clarity on rules hastily 
enacted and poorly communicated gave free 
rein to a heavily securitised response to a public 
health issue. In Mozambique62 and Nigeriaf reports 
quickly emerged of excessive force being used to 
enforce lockdown measures. In both countries this 
included reports of not only arrests and extortion, 
but also allegations of extra-judicial killings by 
police for minor infractions like not wearing face 
masks in public. In Nigeria reports of police using 
the threat of lockdown enforcements to sexually 
assault women alarmed rights advocates, and 
police arrested people in border areas for breaking 
interstate travel bans whilst going about daily life.63 
By July, a report by Bloomberg highlighted that the 
security response was ‘deadlier than the disease’.64
Alongside these attacks on human rights, lockdown 
restrictions and the ‘securitisation’ response 
had an immediate effect in reducing civic space 
available to challenge authorities. With gatherings 
forbidden and new rules regulating freedom of 
movement, physical protests were banned, or 
heavily policed. In August Nigerian security forces 
arrested peaceful protestors in Abuja for violating 
social distancing rules, although these arrests 
were accused of being politically motivated.65 
Demonstrations and political rallies in Pakistan 
were not granted permission on the grounds of 
public health66. 
But these restrictions were not applied equally. 
In Nigeria mass rallies by political parties were 
allowed by the APC and PDP parties in the run up to 
the September 2020 governorship election67. These 
took place without social distancing measures and 
only shortly after demonstrators had been arrested 
for publicly gathering to demand better governance 
of the pandemic68. This, and impressions that 
the political and economic elite were still able to 
gather in large numbers for 
burials and weddings, was seen 
by our panel to be ‘powering 
narratives that Nigerian elites 
and political class are above the 
law’. During conflict in southern 
Kaduna in June there were also 
reports of the discriminatory 
application of curfew laws, 
with indigenous farmers told 
to stay inside whilst herders were not punished for 
grazing freely on their farms69. In Pakistan, the new 
rules and public health justifications were used 
selectively to target opposition voices. Sectarian 
The pandemic 
fuelled new forms of 
human rights abuses 
under the cover of new 
restrictions and public 
health measures.
– NIGERIA RESEARCH TEAM
f See Closing Spaces Database for examples from Nigeria: https://closingspaces.org/covid-19/
ABOVE
Leaders of a 
Quranic school 
in the city of 
Beira arrested 
for violating 
the State of 
Emergency in 
Mozambique 







religious organisations were permitted to hold 
anti-Shia rallies and gatherings of hundreds of 
thousands whilst opposition parties were ordered 
not to gather70, and bans on public gathering were 
seen to be used strategically by the ruling party, 
for example being issued the day after the Gilgit-
Baltistan elections in November71. 
In all three countries the familiar tactic of forced 
disappearance continued, arguably made easier 
by stay-at-home orders. In Mozambique and 
Pakistan cases were noted to particularly affect 
journalists – in the former those reporting from the 
conflict-affected Cabo Delgado72, and in Pakistan 
those questioning the securitisation of the state73. 
In Pakistan forced disappearances have long been 
an issue in the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
and Balochistan, and were reported as increasing 
in Sindh. In Nigeria, our panel highlighted how 
the closure of the court system for public health 
reasons took away one route for civil society actors 
to challenge unlawful arrests and detentions. 
Following the EndSARS protests in October 
numerous reported incidents of missing persons 
were highlighted by civil society watchdogs74. 
As the first wave of transmission waned, the 
securitisation trend continued, and restrictions on 
civic freedoms persisted, and were taken advantage 
of by the establishment. In Mozambique, the State 
of Emergency was extended three times, and a new 
Act of Parliament passed in August allowing a new 
‘state of public calamity’ to be announced by the 
President for an undetermined period75. In Nigeria, 
the federal government introduced new legislation, 
the Infectious Disease Bill 2020, that sought to grant 
powers to law enforcement officers to apprehend 
people suffering from infectious diseases, and 
unparalleled powers to the Nigerian Centre for 
Disease Control to detain members of the public 
and minors indefinitely76, which members of our 
panel referred to as containing ‘omnibus’ clauses 
that dramatically empowered the state. 
During the pandemic long-running attempts to 
increase state powers to regulate civil society 
actors continued. In Pakistan official registration 
requirements for CSOs have increased and been used 
to pressure and limit the freedom of civic actors. 
Since 2019 federal and provincial governments have 
been pressured to create new Charity Commissions, 
increasing the number of bodies that CSOs need to 
register with and that can restrict their operations77. 
Shortly following the first wave of the pandemic the 
Punjab government made it mandatory for all NGOs 
to register with the Punjab Charity Commission 
within 30 days78. In other provinces major national 
advocacy organisations had their registrations 
revoked under similar rules. Our panel noted that 
divided by this and similar requirements CSOs 
resorted to lobbying to gain individual exemptions. 
Such regulation often happens under the guise 
of efforts to eliminate terrorist and proscribed 
organisations, or prevent financial crime. In Nigeria, 
the Companies Allied Matters Act, on the table pre-
pandemic, was passed in August. The Nigerian Action 
Group on Free Civic Space pointed out that although 
the act was meant to focus on corporate governance, 
it actually empowers authorities to restrict CSO 
operations and freedom of association79. CSOs that 
had supported EndSARS protesters and joined their 
calls for accountability were subsequently placed 
under state surveillance and several de-registered 
in an attempt to silence them80.
Individual activists and dissenting voices were also 
pressured by authorities, and punished for their 
protest actions during the year. Across cities in 
Pakistan students mobilised in November in the 
third annual Student Solidarity March adding the 
problems that emerged in Pakistan’s education 
system since Covid-19 to their existing demands81. 
After the Lahore event a detention order was issued 
against academic and activist Ammar Ali Jan82. The 
way he was described in that order, as a ‘symbol of 
frightens’ [sic], took off on as a hashtag on Twitter, 
mocking the authorities, but also indicating the way 
that such actions are intended to instil a climate 
of fear. In Nigeria, the response to EndSARS by 
the government included targeting of individual 
activists and supporters for arrest, with travel bans 
or passport removal, or with blocking of individuals’ 
bank accounts83. Authorities also targeted activists 
through the courts, for example listing prominent 
celebrities as defendants in a lawsuit accusing 
them of using their Twitter accounts for the ‘the 
promotion of unlawful assembly’84. In Mozambique, 
a strike coordinated by business owners in the 
second-largest city, Beira, which closed businesses 
for three days in protest at insecurity and a spate 
of kidnappings, was met with threats to fine 
businesses for actions ‘contrary to public interests’85. 
3.2 Freedom of press and of 
expression
Press freedom was under pressure in all three 
of our countries, as the pandemic heightened 
sensitivities of those in power and exposed them 
to critique. In Nigeria data gathered by Spaces 
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for Change indicates an increase in attacks on 
freedom of speech during the year. In March the 
Nigerian Presidency barred some media outlets 
from covering its activities, limiting their ability to 
cover the pandemic response. During the EndSARS 
protests photo-journalists were reported to be 
targeted and attacked by security services, and 
news outlets fined and threatened with closure 
by the National Broadcasting Commission for 
‘unprofessional coverage’ of the protests. In 
Mozambique, the offices of newspaper ‘Canal i’ 
were attacked and set on fire in August, four days 
after publishing an investigation into fraudulent 
contracts that benefitted the party elite88. Press 
access and media reporting on the conflict in Cabo 
Delgado was greatly impaired, with journalists 
arrested or disappeared. All but one local radio 
station in the region was reported as still operating 
by November, and observatory panel members 
suspected that TV news channel coverage was 
being controlled by authorities. 
In Pakistan journalists critical of the ruling 
party or military continued to be targeted by 
the authorities, with pressure taking many 
forms. Several disappearances or kidnappings 
of male journalists brought about protests. 
Female journalists were subjected to sustained 
harassment and death and rape threats online 
(see Box 8). For some women, negotiating space 
from their families to continue working has 
become more difficult as a result. In August a 
group of well-known female journalists submitted 
a joint statement highlighting this harassment by 
individuals linked to the ruling party, highlighting 
that those who had criticised the government’s 
handling of the pandemic were especially 
targeted89. Numerous journalists remain under 
investigation by the Federal Investigation Agency 
(FIA), according to the Pakistan Federation Union 
of Journalists90. In July, shortly after press outcry 
over another disappearance, a para-military force 
called the Rangers raided the Karachi Press Club91. 
The Pakistan observatory panel also discussed 
instances where media outlets appeared to be 
punished with loss of advertising where their 
coverage was critical of the government. They 
agreed that government insistence that journalists 
should remain ‘neutral’ in their reporting was 
‘doublespeak’ for expecting coverage to be 
favourable to the establishment.
In the context of uncertainty and conflicting 
information that the pandemic brought, and in 
keeping with the emerging tactics of authoritarian 
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leaders worldwide, accusations of ‘fake news’ 
were targeted by governments to undermine 
independent reporting and narratives. In 
Mozambique the President publicly accused the 
independent press of spreading fake news in 
November, specifically related to their coverage 
of the conflict in the north, and encouraged the 
military to suppress such coverage92. In Pakistan 
journalist Ahmed Noorani’s exposé on a prominent 
political aide led to him being accused of spreading 
fake news, with a news channel accusing him of 
working for anti-state interest – an accusation 
that spurred death threats online93. In Nigeria 
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authorities responded to the EndSARS protests 
by spreading disinformation on CSOs and outlets 
involved in reporting and assisting the campaign94.
The upshot of both targeting of critical journalists and 
accusations of fake news is significant. Our panels 
reported that even independent media outlets 
can no longer be trusted to reflect the situation on 
the ground, silenced through self-censorship in an 
atmosphere of fear. This applied in both traditional 
outlets and online publications and sources.
3.3 Tightening online space
The public health measures of the pandemic 
closed down many ‘offline’ spaces for protest, 
hastening a move to online spaces. However 
as civic action moved online, so did efforts to 
undermine and regulate it, and silence critical 
voices. One of our researchers spoke of the 
surge in digital action as a ‘moment in the sun’ 
before authorities caught up, and another about 
social media as a ‘double-
edge sword’ for activists given 
their subsequent targeting 
by authorities. Some of the 
pressure online came from 
direct harassment and threats. 
As noted above, women 
journalists who reported 
against the government’s 
narrative on its Covid-19 
response in Pakistan found 
themselves targeted with 
online harassment and trolling. 
One described her Twitter timeline being ‘flooded 
with abuses’98. Pressure also came from increased 
The more the civic 
space expands beyond 
the traditional media 
outlets, the streets and 
town halls, the wider 
the dragnet of targets 
of governmental 
crackdowns.
– NIGERIA RESEARCH TEAM
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Box 8
Case study: Online harassment and persecution of female 
journalists in Pakistan
Benazir Shah, editor at the Geo News, was active 
in investigating Covid-19 in Pakistan since the 
start of the pandemic, writing several news pieces 
about its emerging impact and posting daily 
updates of cases and deaths that she received 
from official sources on her Twitter feed.
Shah and other female colleagues who published 
this kind of critical coverage of the pandemic 
response were subjected to a wave of sexual 
harassment and abuse online, which they suspect 
was coordinated by the ruling party.
Shah explains, ‘Since I began Covid reporting […] 
my timeline would just be flooded with abuses’. 
She says the harassment campaign is intended 
to ‘target women journalists so much that they 
stop tweeting’95. Sadly, male journalists also 
suggest that their female colleagues stop using 
Twitter, not understanding that social media is 
the only platform for them to raise their voice in 
a climate of shrinking civic space. Similarly, Ailia 
Zehra, a journalist with digital news platform 
Naya Daur, published an article in early March 
highlighting that Imran Khan’s statements about 
the virus and its transmission did not reflect 
WHO guidelines.
She has since been trolled many times on Twitter, 
but recently the ruling party shared a doctored 
video of Zehra on Twitter, increasing the pressure. 
Zehra claimed that, ‘The Covid situation exposed 
the government's incompetence and its inability 
to deal with such a situation which is what we 
reported. This is why government trolls tried to 
silence us. And of course women journalists are 
an easier target’96.
Even those supposed to regulate online media 
are implicated. Recently the FIA charged nine 
women journalists under the PECA after an 
alleged sexual harasser, a well-known singer, 
filed a defamation case against them for their 
coverage of a case of sexual harassment he 
allegedly committed. Although Zehra provided 
proof of death threats and rape threats on her 
Twitter account and personal WhatsApp number, 
the FIA instead helped the alleged harasser 
to place defamation charges against women 
journalists, activists and lawyers97. 
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use of the online space for state surveillance of 
activists. Our cross-country observatory panel 
noted the ways that such attacks led to self-
censorship by activists, stopping them from 
speaking out in fear of reprisals. 
Legal regulations were used in both Pakistan and 
Nigeria to increase state control of digital tools 
and spaces and limit free expression. In Pakistan 
the PECA was used to investigate and arrest 
journalists for their online posts, accusing them 
of defamation. Stricter rules on social media 
companies, including sharing unencrypted data 
with authorities, were introduced early in 202099. 
A variety of popular apps were banned during the 
rest of the year, with some suggesting that the 
block on TikTok was related to the emergence of 
political content on the platform100. The Supreme 
Court hinted at the possibility of re-instating a ban 
on YouTube for inciting hatred against members of 
the judiciary, government, and armed forces101. In 
October 2020 new regulations were passed under 
the PECA requiring data localisation, and granting 
further wide-ranging powers to the Pakistan 
Telecommunication Authority to determine 
what content is unlawful and issue blanket bans, 
including for material that threatens ‘public 
order’102. In Nigeria, the 2015 Cybercrime Act has 
often been used to intimidate online journalists 
and citizens103 and terrorism legislation was also 
used to target and detain individuals for online 
posts critical of government104. 
3.4 Social division, 
stigmatisation and polarisation
Across countries, the response to the pandemic 
exacerbated existing social divisions, with both 
discourse and action playing into tensions 
between communities, and the pandemic hitting 
those already excluded or vulnerable harder. A 
more fractious and antagonistic public debate 
raised the stakes for those acting in civic space, 
particularly those acting for the needs of often-
stigmatised minorities.
In the early days of the pandemic, before cases 
were widespread and community transmission 
accepted, it was often framed as an ‘imported’ 
virus, and supposed ‘carrier’ population groups 
stigmatised. In Mozambique, the arrival of the 
virus in Maputo via a senior Frelimo figure who 
contracted it on a visit to London was widely 
discussed, intensifying perceptions of Covid-19 
as an ‘elite’ or ‘foreigners’ disease, but as it 
spread to the North popular narratives began 
to stigmatise local religious and ethnic minority 
groups as carriers of the virus105. In Pakistan, the 
focus from media and government on the risk of 
the virus spreading through those returning from 
religious pilgrimage to Iran, and the migration 
along the Iran and Afghanistan borders reinforced 
anti-Shia and anti-Hazara sentiments, who were 
blamed by some for importing the virus106. One 
of our panellists explained 
in June how members of the 
Hazara ethnic group in Quetta 
were increasingly experiencing 
mob attacks and persecution 
by officials in the light of this 
stigmatisation. As noted above, 
quarantine centres set up in 
border crossing towns became 
key sites of virus transmission 
amongst an already 
marginalised group107. 
As transmission spread and the 
parallel actions of authorities 
to enforce lockdown measures 
and provide targeted relief ramped up, further 
tensions were inflamed. In Nigeria conflict re-
ignited in South Kaduna, where stay-at-home 
orders and curfews were more strictly enforced for 
minority ethnic and Christian farmers, increasing 
their vulnerability to a resurgence of violence from 
other groups108. Our panel highlighted how the 
enforcement of these orders prevent community 
self-organising for relief or protection, and external 
aid to those affected by the conflict. One of our 
members reported that this new wave of violence 
during the pandemic further fuelled debates about 
the perceived bias of the Kaduna State Government 
against the Christian minority populations. 
In Pakistan discrimination surfaced as it has done 
before in how humanitarian relief was distributed, 
both in relation to Covid-19 and flooding, in 
particular to non-Muslims. Civil society protests 
broke out in Karachi accusing relief workers of 
being reluctant to provide relief goods to the 
local Hindu population109. Against a background 
of stigmatisation and sectarianism, one panellist 
highlighted that anti-Shia wall chalking – a common 
practice in Pakistan during the 1980s – was re-
appearing in Karachi110. 
These specific examples sit against a growing 
sectarianism experienced in Pakistan across the 
year111. One expression of this, also noted in 
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In the wake of the 
pandemic, social media 
apps are crucial to foster 
dialogue and debate but 
the state refuses to stop 
moral policing and 
censorship which 
ultimately restricts the 
country’s civic space.
– PAKISTAN RESEARCH TEAM
30
Nigeria, came to be referred to in our discussions 
as ‘the weaponisation’ of blasphemy accusations. 
Our panel observed that the pandemic’s first six 
months saw a sudden and disturbing increase in 
blasphemy accusations and associated vigilante 
actions in Pakistan. There was a particular surge 
in accusations against Shias in Pakistan in August 
around observation of Muharram, and numerous 
journalists had similar charges laid against them in 
the courts across the year112. Although accusations 
came from multiple directions, our Pakistan panel 
saw these as a coordinated campaign to sustain 
insecurity and conflict, and reinforce the role of 
the military and federal government, particularly 
in Sindh and Balochistan. Often they were more 
blatantly political, using the blasphemy charge as 
a tool of persecution and harassment. A politician 
from the ruling PTI filed a blasphemy complaint in 
July against Khwaja Asif, an opposition politician, 
for saying that all religions are equal113. In Nigeria 
Mubarak Bala was arrested for blasphemy in 
April, and transferred to Kano State, known for 
its intolerance for religious dissent. Mubarak was 
detained in solitary confinement, without access 
to representation, and un-charged for months. Our 
panel discussed how others accused of blasphemy 
couldn’t access legal support given the lockdown 
measures and fears amongst lawyers that they 
would be targeted with violence for being involved 
in these high-profile cases. 
3.5 Centralisation and 
sub-national divergence
The need for decisive action in the face of the 
pandemic not only saw the shift of power towards 
the executive or military discussed above, but 
also a centralisation of authority and increasing 
tensions between national and sub-national 
authorities115, with consequences for the locally 
empowering and democratising effects – actual 
or potential – of each country’s decentralisation 
trajectories to date. 
In Mozambique, our panel saw the State of 
Emergency as centralising decision-making further 
still in a context where local authorities lacked 
significant discretion in the first place. In Pakistan, 
the federal government revived the debate over 
decentralisation itself, suggesting revision of the 
18th Amendment of the Constitution that provides 
for devolved budgets and authority116.
There were differences in approach to the 
pandemic between national and sub-national 
authorities. In Pakistan provincial governments 
took different public health approaches to the 
federal government. One activist in Sindh spoke of 
people being ‘trapped between two narratives’ – 
one of the Sindh Government emphasising WHO 
advice, and a national narrative that initially at least 
downplayed the severity of the virus and opposed 
lockdown measures on economic grounds. Broader 
political tensions informed this, with Sindh the only 
province not governed by the national ruling party, 
PTI, and further conflict between the two levels of 
government across the year117. In Nigeria, our panel 
discussed examples of inconsistency between 
national and state or local regulations, which 
meant that companies 
complying with regulations 
set by federal government 
were found to be violating 
local laws.
There were also tensions 
around distribution of 
pandemic relief and aid. In 
Nigeria State Governors of 
oil-producing states claimed 
that they were overlooked in 
the ‘palliatives’ of Covid-19 
relief118. In Pakistan, our 
panel heard reports of 
political friction when the federal government 
refused emergency assistance to the Government 
of Balochistan to provide relief rations for those in 
quarantine.
These tensions and differences combined with the 
sub-national conflicts going on in all three countries 
to make civic space far from uniform across their 
territories. The unevenness of civic space had 
different characteristics in different places. In 
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The pandemic’s first 
six months saw a sudden 
and disturbing increase 
in blasphemy 
accusations and vigilante 
actions which the 
government appeared 
unsure whether to 
condemn or condone.
– PAKISTAN RESEARCH TEAM
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Mozambique, our panel saw not only significantly 
more curtailed space in areas of conflict, but also 
urban/rural divides. Organisations outside of the 
capital were reported to be less able to adapt to 
online forms of action and support, given lower 
levels of connectivity, resources, and skills. It is 
notable that a coalition of CSOs that came together 
to monitor Covid-19 emergency funds (discussed 
more below) included no organisations outside of 
the capital, Maputo. In Pakistan, the differences in 
more conflictual areas, where disappearances and 
lack of access to information were more common, 
and in opposition-run Sindh were seen as crucial 
to understand experiences of civic space. For our 
Nigerian panel, the exploitation of tensions in 
states like South Kaduna and Kano highlighted 
perceived differences in freedoms in the South 
versus the North of Nigeria. They reflected that 
civic actors in the North were more vulnerable 
to crackdowns linked to freedom of expression 
relating to faith, religion and morality while their 
counterparts in the South were more likely to get 
into trouble for critical commentary directed at 
state actors.
3.6 Shifts in funding flows
The pandemic put significant financial pressure 
on governments and civic organisations alike. 
The need to re-direct resources to pandemic 
response had its own impacts on civic space, 
including re-direction of donor funds that 
previously supported a wider range of CSO 
activity (a trend also evidenced globally119). This 
led to changes in the landscape for CSOs in our 
three countries, including exacerbating divisions 
amongst civic actors. 
In our three contexts international funding of 
civic organisations, and particular larger CSOs, 
has been important historically in sustaining 
their role in civic space. The re-direction of 
funds to Covid-19 relief had both positive 
and negative effects. In Mozambique and 
Pakistan, it increased the pressure on advocacy 
and rights-based organisations that were 
already facing significant funding problems, 
threatening to remove these voices from the 
civic arena. In Pakistan, in contrast to previous 
emergencies, our panel observed that NGOs 
working on advocacy and with more of a rights 
orientation were quietly side-lined from the 
emergency response to Covid-19, despite having 
a potential role to play. Their view was that 
donors’ decisions on which NGOs to fund were 
influenced by government preference to more 
service-oriented, less politically challenging, 
organisations. In Mozambique there was also 
significant concern amongst our panel that 
funds were being re-directed to Covid-19 away 
from the needs of displaced communities and 
human rights defence in conflict-affected areas. 
In both Mozambique and Pakistan the increase 
in funding flowing through state institutions was 
seen to increase the risks of co-optation of civic 
actors by authorities. More positively, researchers 
in Nigeria observed a more positive pattern of 
donors giving CSOs more 
flexibility in how they 
responded and reoriented 
their work to immediate 
community needs, 
recognising their networks 
and grassroots links. 
In this context of changing 
funding, there were points 
where our panels saw 
competition between CSOs 
increasing, weakening the 
potential for collective voice 
and coordinated action. 
Examples of this came to be discussed regularly 
in our project’s observatory panels. Competition 
for funds was considered a major barrier to the 
success of CSOs in Mozambique and Nigeria in 
particular. In Mozambique this was referred to as 
the ‘struggle for protagonism’ – with organisations 
seeking to be lead partner in consortia, or 
managing funds on others’ behalf, or being seen 
to be the most effective in responding to the 
pandemic. Panel reflections felt that this built on 
pre-pandemic patterns that had limited how far 
CSOs had managed to impact on governance in 
Mozambique. Competition over funds was one 
of the ways that our Nigerian panel observed 
that civil society actors ‘shrink their own space’. 
In both countries this played into geographic 
differences. In Mozambique our panel observed 
that Maputo-based organisations were better 
placed to find funding, leaving provincially-based 
organisations vulnerable. A similar reflection 
on the concentration of funds on urban-based 
organisations was made in Nigeria. 
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In recent years, 
Mozambican civil 
society has tended to 
segment itself more 
and more and with an 
internal struggle to seek 
protagonism, which 
ends up weakening 
its activism.









Civic action during the pandemic; 
changes in salience in issues, actors 
and coalitions, and repertoires
During the pandemic a host of public policy concerns became newly or 
especially salient, and much civic energy and action shifted towards these. 
Action on these issues drew in and brought together new actors and new 
coalitions, sometimes expanding the repertoires of action they used to 
navigate the available space. 
This came about in part as issues that were most affected by the 
pandemic grew in salience, but also in more subtle ways, as the pandemic 
laid bare the unfairness of the status quo. 
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Important shifts have occurred in civic action in Mozambique, Nigeria, and Pakistan since the onset of the pandemic, in some cases because of, and in some cases in spite of, the narrowing and more repressive 
civic space documented in the previous section. 
We cannot say that these changes are directly driven 
by the pandemic and countries’ responses to it, but 
they are clearly associated with it. None of the civic 
action observed is completely unprecedented: what 
has changed is the salience of particular issues, kinds 
of actor, and repertoires of action during this period. 
The pandemic shifted attention and civic energy 
towards certain issues that stood out in a global and 
national public health emergency situation. Civic 
action focused on issues such as health and emergency 
relief, directly relevant to controlling the spread and 
effects of the virus, and on areas of life that were 
disproportionately affected by government responses to 
the pandemic, such as gender-based violence, livelihood 
struggles, education and law and order120. While these 
issues were not invisible nor uncontested before the 
pandemic, they grew in salience as a result of it.
Drawn out by the changing salience of issues, new 
actors and new coalitions came to the fore, sometimes 
out of necessity and other times as a strategic response. 
With them came adaptation and expansion of the 
usual repertoires of action, so that civil society actors 
could better navigate the available space. More unruly 
repertoires were on the ascendant, and citizen oversight 
mechanisms arose to monitor Covid-19 emergency 
relief, driven by a sense that mismanagement of these 
funds undermines the moral economy of society. The 
shifts in repertoire reflect declining trust between 
citizens and governments at this juncture where the 
status quo within societies has been laid bare and its 
fairness deeply and often indignantly questioned.
Online space became all the more important and 
an increasingly powerful arena for activism and 
dissent121. This activism included the involvement of 
wider groups of citizens in public debate and calls for 
government action. Numerous successful examples of 
‘digital protest’ and online petitioning through hashtag 
campaigns emerged during the pandemic period122. 
In Nigeria, our panel saw online activism, for example 
through Twitter and Facebook, allowing citizens to 
circumvent restrictions on traditional media, and to 
‘speak truth to authorities’ with less fear of reprisal. 
Social media and digital technologies also allowed 
rapid sharing of eye-witness evidence of what was 
happening on the ground, for example in the EndSARS 
protests in Nigeria123, enabling activists to counter 
official narratives. In Mozambique, our panel noted 
that for established CSOs the shift to communicating 
online widened their audiences and re-connected 
them with their constituencies, though it also 
intensified the gap in visibility and voice between 
Maputo-based and local NGOs. Digital technologies 
allowed new networks and connections to be built 
– sometimes reported to generate social capital that 
could feed both online and offline activism. 
In the sections that follow we explore these general 
trends through the lens of civic action on six especially 
salient issues.
4.1 Healthcare
It is no surprise that the pandemic put public 
healthcare systems under the microscope, with health 
systems worldwide struggling to cope, and healthcare 
workers on the frontline of the fight against the 
pandemic. Correspondingly, these workers and their 
allies have mobilised across the world to demand 
more resources, greater protection in the form of 
PPE and risk payments, and greater recognition. 
Projects like the Accountability Research Center’s 
health worker protest project have been tracking and 
compiling theseg. CSOs have responded in solidarity 
but also in the direct delivery of public health services, 
filling in for deficiencies in government responses124.
In Pakistan, many groups of health workers 
were already mobilising before the pandemic, 
challenging moves to privatise healthcare systems 
and campaigning on their working conditions. The 
crisis of the pandemic and its impact, including the 
deaths of medics and nurses from Covid-19, saw 
increasing action by the ‘Grand Health Alliance’ 
(GHA) bringing together previously mobilised doctors 
and Lady Health Workers with newly mobilised 
nurses and medical students joining campaigns that 
included boycotts, strikes, and demonstrations125. 
The Medical Association of Mozambique took court 
action against the Ministry of Health and the Ministry 
of Economy and Finance in October 2020 for not 
fulfilling promises to pay overtime and risk subsidies 
in relation to Covid-19126. In Nigeria, doctors and 
nurses also protested, including through strike action, 
at inadequate working conditions and provision of 
PPE, and unions campaigned successfully on issues 
of hazard allowances and life insurance127. The 
observatory panel and representatives of unions in 
Nigeria observed that this marked a change in strategy 
g See https://twitter.com/HealthWorkerPro 
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for a previously conservative and less confrontational 
part of the workforce – ‘reshaping the dynamics 
of medical activism’ as health unions ‘deepened 
their understanding of the interconnectedness 
and interdependence of all social and economic 
issues’128. Helping these various attempts by 
health workers to make forceful demands on the 
system were a sense of public support for the 
vulnerability forced on them by the pandemic and 
the inadequacy of government responses.
Civil society actors in all three countries responded 
to immediate needs by repurposing their resources 
and networks to deliver health-related pandemic 
emergency aid, in line with the approaches 
identified in many other contexts, for example the 
strategies observed by Brechenmacher et al129. 
Sometimes this was a deliberate move to partner 
with government. In Mozambique, our researchers 
observed this to include a 
number of organisations 
who had previously taken 
a critical stance towards 
government, with some 
reflections that this was a 
‘win-win’ strategy that 
also gave them space to 
operate on the ground 
and to monitor the 
implementation of 
Covid-19 strategies and funding by government. 
In Pakistan large non-profit health organisations 
were observed to be heavily involved in the 
response with government support – continuing a 
trend of government supporting civil society actors 
focused on service delivery rather than advocacy 
or campaigning.
h This case study draws on Khan, Khwaja, and Jawed (2021)
When we mobilise for 
our rights by going on the 
roads or to the Press Club, 
only then the government 
listens to us.
– HALIMA LEGHARI, PRESIDENT OF 
ALL SINDH HEALTHWORKERS AND 
EMPLOYEES UNION, PAKISTAN
Box 9
Case study: Upheaval and unrest in Pakistan’s health sectorh  
The pandemic has put health service providers in 
danger of contracting Covid-19. It has also afforded 
them opportunities to build public support for their 
ongoing demands for improved working conditions.
In Pakistan, the pandemic added fuel to doctors’ 
ongoing campaign against the privatisation of 
medical colleges and public hospitals, which is 
planned as part of the IMF-mandated reforms in 
the provinces. Doctors contend that privatisation 
would make healthcare less accessible to the poor 
and endanger their job security as government 
employees. When the Province of Punjab passed 
into law a reform of medical training in line with 
these reforms in March 2020, paramedics, nurses 
and young doctors across Pakistan mobilised the 
Grand Health Alliance (GHA) against this law. 
Momentum gathered, bolstered by additional 
health workers’ grievances about lack of PPE, ill 
treatment by patients and relatives under stringent 
Covid-19 hospital visiting rules, and mounting 
fatalities among their cadres. Additional nurses, 
hired by government in an attempt to manage 
emergency demand in hospitals, came out in 
protest in May 2020 when they too began to 
suffer high infection rates. In December 2020 the 
government announced the privatisation of the 
Pakistan Institute of Medical Sciences, and the GHA 
scaled up its protests into a fully-fledged strike. 
Government responses varied, from arrests of 
protesting health workers in Quetta to negotiations 
over PPE and pay in Lahore and Karachi.
Also mobilised before the pandemic were 
Pakistan’s Lady Health Workers (LHWs). These 
frontline community health workers, who provide 
vaccinations, contraception and maternal health 
screening in rural and peri-urban areas, have 
formed associations to demand improved 
employment conditions since 2010, holding strikes, 
sit-ins and legal petitions. In October, tired of 
inadequate PPE, limited health risk allowances 
and the inability to meet patients’ demands due 
to global supply chain disruptions, thousands of 
LHWs held a sit-in outside the National Assembly 
in Islamabad and were joined by the temporary 
nurses. Government agreed to meet their demands.
Yet another strand of unrest in the health 
sector during the pandemic is medical students’ 
opposition to changes to their examination 
structure and licensing system. A legal petition 
and online activism led to a delay in the medical 
school admissions exam in November 2020, 
which then went ahead despite rising Covid-19 
infection rates, leading protesters to question its 
legality and demand a re-test.
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4.2 Providing and monitoring 
Covid relief 
One of the primary forms of civic action during the 
pandemic related to relief work and monitoring of 
relief funds. Globally, CSOs set about repurposing 
themselves to do emergency relief work during 
the pandemic130. Some have argued that the 
pandemic presented a window of opportunity 
to demand accountability from government131. 
Across our three countries several different civic 
actors engaged in different forms of civic action to 
take on crucial relief work during the pandemic.  
In Pakistan, several protests were held to demand 
that the state and coalitions provide relief 
to those in need. Protests against the lack of 
services in government hospitals were discussed 
by our panel, who also noted that due to the 
shortage of PPE kits NGOs were providing these 
to doctors. When floods hit Karachi, and residents 
staged protests demanding better support 
from authorities, CSOs worked with the state to 
provide much-needed relief. The state needed 
NGOs to provide services in the health sector, 
and our panel discussed how non-profit health 
organisations were helping the government with 
vaccine testing facilities and public messaging 
related to the pandemic. In Nigeria, several 
coalitions were key to Covid-19 relief. By the end 
of March, the private sector Coalition Against 
Covid-19 (CACOVID) had raised over USD 72 
million for the purchase of food relief materials 
and to provide medical facilities and equipment in 
different regions of the country132. 
In Nigeria rights organisations like Spaces for 
Change provided free legal helplines to support 
victims of Covid-19 lockdown measures. Over 190 
Catholic parishes in Lagos donated and distributed 
palliative items that reached more than 100,000 
households133. In Mozambique, our panel 
discussed how several CSOs were involved in the 
provision of services, such as awareness-raising, 
distribution of masks, disinfectants and buckets. 
Many CSOs, since the first moments of the 
pandemic in the country, were involved in service 
provision activities, with the status of ‘government 
partners’. These included organisations with a 
more independent history, and more critical of 
government. An activist and rights-oriented CSO 
leader from Sofala Province noted that in the 
context of the pandemic the government showed 
more openness to these arrangements, but 
continuing a trend that they felt was driven by 
the government’s lack of resources, that this was 
‘taking advantage’ of civic organisations, limited 
to direct service provision, and only as far as 
organisations ‘complied’ with government’s 
own aims134.
Attempts to hold the government accountable 
were witnessed in Mozambique and Nigeria. 
CSOs in Nigeria demanded accountability for 
Covid-19 funds by writing letters to state 
governments to publish their spending of these 
funds received. A CSO, Africa Network for 
Environment & Economic Justice (ANEEJ) and 
MANTRAi partners began the nationwide 
monitoring of disbursement of relief money 
to poor Nigerians135. In Mozambique, 
CSOs were reported to use services as entry 
points for actions more linked to governance 
issues, such as the monitoring of schools by a 
CSO to assess preparedness to reopen schools. 
Some of these CSOs managed to monitor 
government action, thus navigating within a civic 
space marked by major constraints. Additionally, 
several CSOs also managed to monitor the 
expenditure of Covid-19 funds through civil 
society coalitions136 (see Box 10). Delays in paying 
relief payments related to the devasting impacts 
of Cyclone Idai led thousands of people to gather 
outside the Sofala Provincial Government’s 
building to demand justice and transparency in 
the allocation of the funds137. 
Across all three countries CSOs were involved in 
providing critical emergency services, often in 
partnership with the government. Civic actors 
were also involved in holding the government 
accountable regarding Covid-19 funds, particularly 
in Mozambique and Nigeria. Coalitions were 
critical during emergency relief, both to provide 
the relief and to hold the government 
accountable. More ‘unruly’ tactics such as sit-ins, 
violent protests, and riots were also visible 
alongside these partnerships and advocacy 
efforts. 
i MANTRA stands for Monitoring Asset Recovery in Nigeria through Transparency and Accountability - a development initiative 
funded by external donors: https://www.mantra-acorn.com/ 
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4.3 Education
Education was one of the key sites of disruption 
and contention during Covid-19, against the 
background of widespread challenges in schools 
and university access and quality. Issues such as 
school and university closure and inequalities 
in remote learning brought forth demands for 
accountability from civic actors and the general 
public. Simultaneously students and teachers played 
a significant role in popular protests during this 
period. Across our three countries civic actors, both 
organised civil society and the general public, played 
a significant role in trying to hold the government 
accountable for its education policies. In doing so 
they showed that collective action was possible 
despite the overall clampdown on civic space, and 
particularly on issues of suddenly higher priority.
Concerns about student safety and possible 
transmission of the virus were highlighted by groups 
in all three countries. Medical students in Pakistan 
demanded postponement of examinations. In 
Nigeria, teacher unions warned the government 
that implementing distancing guidance and other 
safety measures was infeasible for public schools139. 
In Mozambique, the NGO-led campaign ‘Education 
for All’ advocated for school closures until schools 
were safe for students, pushing the government to 
issue clear guidelines for the reopening of schools140.
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Box 10
Case study: Monitoring Covid-19 relief funds in Mozambique  
Transparency in the use of public funds is a major 
concern of CSOs in Mozambique, particularly 
those that work in the area of governance and 
belong to the Budget Monitoring Forum (Fórum 
de Monitoria do Orçamento, FMO).  
When the Mozambican Government secured 
significant Covid-19 relief funds from donor 
governments and the World Bank, the FMO 
launched the initiative ‘Responding to Covid-19 
with the right accounts’. The initiative monitors 
procurement processes and tracks expenses 
allocated to provinces and districts for works and 
service provision in various sectors. It also tracks 
how the Ministry of Health accounts for these 
funds. The FMO’s analysis highlights disbursements 
by province, rural/urban breakdown and uses of 
the funds in terms of types of goods and specific 
institutions. Compiled as reports, the findings 
are presented to and discussed with government 
representatives from the relevant ministries. 
In a setting where public expenditure lacks 
transparency, and civil society lacks experience or 
confidence to confront government, the unusual 
situation of the pandemic has afforded civil society 
an unexpected degree of access and voice on the 
use of Covid-19 relief funds.
Box 11
Case study: Collaborative Covid-19 relief fundraising in Nigeria  
The pandemic mobilised huge philanthropic 
funding in Nigeria. Several national and 
international donors gave funds to the Nigerian 
Government in support of national efforts to 
combat the spread of the Covid-19 pandemic. 
This included USD 114 million from various World 
Bank sources, intended to contain the Covid-19 
outbreak across the 36 states and the Federal 
Capital Territory. The organised private sector, 
under the banner of the 112-organisation-strong 
CACOVID, raised over USD 72 million  for relief 
materials to ameliorate the health crisis and 
economic hardship triggered by the pandemic. 
Among other donations received from the 
religious community, over 190 Catholic parishes 
in Lagos donated and distributed palliative items 
that reached more than 100,000 households. 
Such an influx of charitable donations and 
aid opened up several new fronts for citizens 
and CSOs to strengthen their demands for 
accountability in public expenditure for 
healthcare and social welfare provisions.
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In Balochistan, Pakistan, students protested at how 
their lack of stable internet connections, in the 
face of strict internet controls and shutdowns, was 
impacting their learning as classes moved online141. 
Our panels discussed the ‘digital divide’ for students 
during the pandemic as a serious concern, and 
noted too the gendered implications of school and 
university closures, with girls facing increasing risk 
of being expected to do domestic work rather than 
studying from home. 
In Pakistan, civic action around pre-Covid issues 
such as the right to form student unions, bigger 
budgets for higher education, and sexual harassment 
on campuses, persisted during the pandemic, but 
also incorporated the challenges of studying under 
Covid-19. The Student Solidarity March in Pakistan in 
November raised these issues as well as the impact 
of poor internet provision throughout the country 
on remote learning142. Other issues such as the 
Federal Government’s attempt to institute the Single 
National Curriculum became major talking points 
in the media, with discussions on the Islamisation 
of education. In Nigeria, closure of universities in 
March 2020 allowed for the high participation of 
the youth in protests and civic mobilisation. These 
included student union-led protests around electricity 
and fuel price hikes143, the August #RevolutionNow 
demonstrations144, and the EndSARS mobilisation. 
During the latter, the government announced 
universities would re-open, interpreted by some as 
attempting to neutralise the protests145.
Overall, one common theme across our countries has 
been the public debate over reopening of schools. Civic 
action by students and teachers was more visible in 
Nigeria and Pakistan, whereas Mozambique witnessed 
a more central role played by CSOs. While both Nigeria 
and Pakistan demonstrate a confrontational approach 
to demanding accountability, in Mozambique 
accountability was sought through gathering and 
presenting evidence. Online mobilisation was a 
prominent strategy across countries, and unruly 
protests, filing legal petitions and media advocacy 
were also prominently used in this period. 
4.4 Gender-based violence
Emergencies and crises are known to increase 
gender-based violence (GBV)146. Evidence globally 
confirms this for the Covid-19 pandemic147. 
Responses and mobilisation from both organised 
and unorganised civil society emerged on these 
issues across all three countries in this project. 
Different forms of civic action were witnessed 
during the pandemic across the three countries 
including protests, advocacy, digital activism, direct 
service provision, coordination with the state and 
other civil society actors, and filing of petitions. In 
Nigeria and Pakistan this included physical protests. 
Pakistan saw protests on the issues of sexual 
harassment on campuses and at workplaces, sexual 
assault against women from minority communities, 
targeted attacks on female journalists, and victim 
blaming by the police148. Nigeria witnessed 
protests over rising GBV during Covid-19149. The 
International Federation of Women Lawyers 
Nigeria, active in this campaign, also offered 
free legal assistance to victims of GBV, as well as 
advocating for policy change150. In Pakistan, our 
panel heard how CSOs were setting up helplines 
and offering shelter to women, in coordination 
with the provincial government in some cases. 
The pandemic also saw increased discussion and 
public condemnation of GBV both online and 
offline. In Nigeria, our panel discussed how a 
high-profile rape case involving a popular singer 
led to much public condemnation of sexual 
violence and the complicity of security forces in 
intimidating victims in such cases. Digital activism 
powered a large-scale petition calling on the UN 
to remove the accused from the position of ‘Youth 
Ambassador’151. Mozambique witnessed public 
condemnation of sexual violence committed by 
members of the police and security forces152. The 
Mozambique panel explored how in two cases, 
information on GBV was digitally circulated via 
social media which led to media discussion of 
sexual violence in Mozambique, and impunity of 
perpetrators more generally. 
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Civic action also took the form of lobbying for 
better policies on GBV in Nigeria and Pakistan, 
continuing pressure on issues under debate for 
some time. In Nigeria, after significant civil society 
and activist pressure, a Sexual Harassment Bill was 
passed in July 2020 focusing on universities and 
tertiary institutions153. Our panel described this as 
a piece of ‘landmark’ legislation and a great win 
for civil society activists, although also noting the 
need to maintain pressure on state-level adoption 
of other relevant legislation. Two ordinances 
concerning sexual violence were passed in the 
Pakistani parliament which banned the controversial 
‘two-finger test’j 154. Students in Pakistan continued 
to demand the inclusion of students in sexual 
harassment committees, and Pakistani journalists 
and feminists wrote a public letter to ‘The State 
of Pakistan’ condemning GBV in the country 
and vicious online attacks on prominent female 
journalists, and making a charter of demands 
involving provisions for women’s safety155. 
Across all three countries GBV was observed 
to have increased and become a part of public 
debates on the effects of the pandemic. State 
actors were observed to perpetrate GBV in all 
three countries. In Mozambique, state actors were 
direct perpetrators of sexual violence, in Nigeria 
they were complicit in protecting the accused and 
harassing victims further, and in Pakistan they 
blamed the victim for the crime. Civil society, 
both formal CSOs and general public, protested, 
engaged in media debates, and pressurised the 
state and international bodies to demand change. 
4.5 Economic issues and 
livelihoods 
The economic impact of the pandemic was 
significant in all three countries. Immediate 
restrictions on businesses and trading were 
followed as the pandemic wore on, with escalating 
concerns about livelihoods, unemployment and 
the costs of basic goods, all of which triggered new 
action and demands from civic organisations. Those 
reliant on the informal economy were particularly 
vulnerable, and the inability of social security and 
social protection systems to cushion the economic 
fall-out was laid bare in many countries156 157. 
Consequently, the pandemic led to several forms of 
civic action led by unions, professional associations, 
and unique coalitions that sought to address issues 
concerning the economy and livelihoods.  
Pakistan saw a variety of civic action related to 
livelihoods, as incomes fell and economic pressure 
mounted. Workers from unions and federations 
held protests and approached the court to address 
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medically unnecessary, and at times painful and traumatic practice.
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issues such as privatisation policies, closure of 
factories, low prices, and increased layoffs among 
other issues. The Pakistan Fisherfolk Forum (PFF), a 
CSO representing the fishing community in coastal 
areas of Pakistan, began to mobilise in September 
against plans to develop two islands off the coast 
of Karachi and the Federal Government’s decision 
to provide licenses to deep-sea fishing trawlers, 
reducing their own income158. Seven hundred 
employees of Radio Pakistan staged a mass sit-in 
against their recent sacking which received a good 
measure of political response, although they have 
not yet been restored159. Hundreds of brick kiln 
workers staged a protest after closures of brick 
kilns160, and bread-makers in Balochistan went 
on strike for days in November demanding better 
fixed prices161. Worker’s groups often acted in 
solidarity, such as in the case of unions supporting 
farmers demanding lower tariffs on electricity162, 
and the collective protests of trade unions and the 
federation of home-based workers163.
In Nigeria unions were active. Interest groups 
actively represented disparate sectors of the 
workforce while protesting job and income loss. 
Our panel reflected that adopting the ‘leaderless’ 
approach taken by other mobilisations was 
connected to common disappointment following 
previous mass actions initiated by trade unions, 
human rights organisations and CSOs, and a loss 
of public trust that these formally organised 
protests would lead to change. Weeks before 
the leaderless EndSARS protests, the leadership 
of the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) and the 
Trade Union Congress (TUC) suspended a planned 
general strike against hikes in electricity tariffs and 
fuel prices164.
There were instances of civic action around 
prices of goods and services in Pakistan and 
Nigeria. In Pakistan, farmer’s demands are rarely 
covered by urban-based media, so in November 
farmers belonging to Kissan Ittehad (KI) and the 
Pakistan’s Farmer’s Board marched to Lahore 
to demand a uniform tariff rate for electricity to 
run tube-wells, an increase in the government’s 
purchase rate of wheat and sugarcane, and a 
price reduction of fertilisers and pesticides in 
all provinces165. Women rallied demanding an 
end to price hikes, joblessness, and the plans for 
commercial development of Sindh islands166. In 
Nigeria, members of political associations like the 
Socialist Party of Nigeria (SPN) and the National 
Conscience Party (NCP), and students from the 
National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS) 
were involved in organising demonstrations 
against the increase in petrol prices and electricity 
tariff. Additionally, the problem of food insecurity 
led to food riots in several parts of the country. 
Thousands broke into warehouses used to store 
allegedly hoarded Covid-19 relief goods, amid 
claims of state corruption167.
Mozambique witnessed civic action in the form of 
advocacy and media debates. The Confederation of 
Economic Association, a business lobby, pressured 
the government to protect lives of workers168. An 
example of public debate covered by the media, 
involving several civic groups, and discussed by 
our panel was about the nature and scope of a 
proposed Sovereign Fund that could create savings 
from Mozambique’s anticipated gas revenues and 
reduce the country’s 
dependence on foreign 
aid as well as promote 
its development based 
on the resources at its 
disposal.  Even though the 
lives and livelihoods of 
those working in small and 
medium enterprises were 
affected by the pandemic, 
our panel didn’t observe 
any significant social 
movement led by trade 
unions or CSOs around the 
issue, with action focusing 
instead on humanitarian 
assistance and poverty 
relief alongside 
fundraising for personal 
protective equipment. 
Overall, in all three countries civic action around 
the economy, livelihoods, and costs of goods and 
services were prominent. We observed several 
protests in Pakistan led by unions and professional 
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associations, interest groups in Nigeria, and 
professional associations and CSOs in Mozambique. 
Unruly protests, sit-ins, advocacy and media 
debates were some of the repertoires used in 
these countries. While these repertoires are not 
new in any of these countries, their use seems to 
have increased in frequency and intensity in a 
period of great economic upheaval and dramatic 
livelihoods impacts.
4.6 Policing and law and order
The heavy-handed and securitised response to the 
pandemic brought to crisis point a range of long-
held grievances about the insecurity facing people 
in their everyday lives, and the role of state actors 
in sustaining or causing that insecurity169. Around 
the world this manifested in a range of action, 
including protests against lockdown and public 
health measures. In all three of our countries, it 
created grounds for flashpoints in relation to law 
and order and the actions of security services.
In Mozambique businesspeople in Beira staged 
a three-day strike in October in protest at the 
state’s inaction or inability to address a wave of 
kidnappings that also affected the capital, Maputo. 
Following a press conference by small business 
leaders others joined the strike, reportedly 
‘paralysing’ the market and trading activity in 
Mozambique’s second-largest city170. Following 
government threats to fine those that closed 
their businesses, civic, religious, and political 
leaders, including the opposition-party Mayor of 
Beira City, added their voices to campaign against 
insecurity. In Pakistan protests and campaigning 
against insecurity focused particularly on the issue 
of forced disappearances and arbitrary arrests 
of government critics and dissenting voices. 
Multiple online campaigns were spurred, often 
successfully, to free prominent arrested journalists 
and commentators171. In August, families of missing 
persons from Balochistan staged a sit-in outside 
the Press Club in Quetta172, continuing many years 
of peaceful protests against abductions which have 
included long marches and hunger strikes. Similar 
sit-in tactics were used in a rare protest by the 
group of women in North Waziristan whose male 
family members had disappeared173. 
In Nigeria demonstrators gathered across the 
country in August to protest under the hashtag 
banner #RevolutionNow, calling for authorities 
to take accountability for rising insecurity and 
poor governance174. Attacks on and arrests of 
the protestors by state security forces were 
justified by the police on public health grounds175. 
These dynamics reappeared a few months later in 
October, as protests erupted at the latest actions of 
the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), under the 
hashtag banner #EndSARS (see Box 12) and tapping 
into widespread anger at police brutality and over-
policing176. The Nigerian observatory panel and 
researchers noted various ways that the pandemic 
context heightened the power of this moment 
and movement. 
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Box 12
Case study: #EndSARS protests177   
The campaign to abolish the Nigerian Special Anti-
Robbery Squad (SARS) first gained prominence in 
online and offline protests in 2018, opposing the 
particular brutality and targeting of young people 
by this police unit. But against a background of 
brutal enforcement of lockdown measures and 
growing insecurity and vulnerability, the October 
2020 protests spurred a significant change in 
direction in Nigerian activism. On 1 October 2020, 
activists mobilised in small demonstrations across 
the country to protest against insecurity and poor 
governance on Nigerian Independence Day. A few 
days later footage of SARS killing of a young man 
in Delta State started circulating online, leading 
to nationwide protests on 8 October. Organised 
largely online, outside of formal organisations, and 
mostly by young people, the protests also gained 
widespread support from businesses, celebrities, 
and religious organisations. Unlike other protests 
and demonstrations in recent Nigerian history, 
the leaderless structure of the movement, 
solidarity of activists, and crowd-funded nature 
of the action resisted attempts at co-optation 
by authorities, and saw a resurgence in mutual 
aid and community organising. The violent and 
deadly crackdown on protests and attempts to use 
Covid-19 restrictions to ban them only fuelled the 
dissent and activism.
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Protestor addresses 
a crowd during 
EndSARS protests 
in Nigeria in 
October 2020.
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In Mozambique, Nigeria and Pakistan civic space has been 
characterised by a deteriorating trend for several years pre-pandemic. 
Covid-19 has simultaneously magnified and intensified the need for a 
vibrant, assertive civil society, given rise to some new dynamics in the 
field of civic action, and exacerbated this trend towards deterioration 
of the space available for that action. What might this mean for 
the medium and longer-term state of governance in each context? 
Our evidence, comprising observed patterns and trends plus the 
experience and grounded interpretations of active members of civil 
society in these contexts, points to three sets of implications: for civic 
space; for citizen-state relations; and for civil society and civic activism.
Implications: What does the ‘new 
normal’ mean for governance?
5
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5.1 For civic space: ’No space 
to breathe’k
The Governments of Mozambique, Nigeria and 
Pakistan have each been particularly swift and 
far-reaching in rolling back democratic progress 
by squeezing an already-constrained civic space 
still further during the pandemic. Here and in a 
wide range of other countries, power seems likely 
to become more centralised and less shared, and 
civic space more constricted in years to come. 
The evidence suggests that the governments 
of these three countries are using the Covid-19 
crisis juncture opportunistically to advance pre-
existing anti-democratic projects of stifling dissent 
and manufacturing consent, not only applying 
temporary measures to protect public health. 
Covid-19 relief partnerships between government 
and CSOs, reflecting opportunism on both sides, 
are likely to be short-lived, small air bubbles in a 
context where there is less and less room for civil 
society to breathe. 
For the foreseeable future, then, as V-DEM 
captured in the title of its latest democracy 
report, autocratisation looks set to remain 
viral178. Civic space in these three countries seems 
likely to be increasingly affected by a process 
of concentration of power, in which aspects of 
decentralised systems are re-centralised and 
sub-national autonomies clawed back. This 
cannot be interpreted as a simple reversal of 
locally empowering democratic decentralisation: 
these are contexts where governance has been 
fragile throughout their post-colonial histories 
and decentralisation processes never decidedly 
democratic, nor always intended to empower 
local levels, nor particularly effective at resolving 
historical sub-national grievances. 
Nonetheless, the marked centralising turn that 
we have observed in Mozambique, Nigeria 
and Pakistan during the pandemic has serious 
ongoing implications for civic space. In these 
contexts of fragile political pluralism, civic space 
at national and sub-national levels has been a 
crucial arena for critical dialogue, expression of 
difference, and pluralism. The centralisation and 
concentration of power tends to increase political, 
ethnic and religious inequality and strife at the 
same time that spaces for managing differences 
peacefully and democratically are coming under 
rising pressure and the economic effects of 
the pandemic are increasing competition for 
resources. It jeopardises the balance of powers, as 
the executive takes and retains a disproportionate 
degree of authority and wields it heavy-handedly 
through the security forces under its command. 
It favours the securitisation of governance, to the 
neglect of other dimensions of the social contract 
and to the benefit of state or dominant party 
schemes to close and control civic space. Our 
Mozambique researcher’s observation that ‘when 
civic space closes, violence rises’179 may capture a 
correlation rather than a causal relationship, but it 
is a correlation to be heeded. 
5.2 For citizen-state relations: 
Prolonged post-pandemic 
polarisation
While the Covid-19 pandemic has been the first of 
its kind since the influenza pandemic of 1918, it is 
acknowledged to herald a more uncertain future, in 
which pandemics join terrorist and nuclear threats 
as occurrences that can never be ruled out180. 
Viewed thus, what we have seen in 2020s–21 is 
only the beginning of an enduring securitisation of 
public health and democratic governance, in which 
civil society and government are re-positioned 
antagonistically with one protecting civil liberties 
and the other a securitised version of public health 
and the common good. 
Governments need civil society, whether they 
like it or not, even if they actively dislike its 
more vocally critical elements181. If this is true in 
ordinary times, it has proven more true in these 
times of Covid, when civil society has been a 
vital ally for targeting relief and delivering health 
prevention messages, and a useful if unwelcome 
barometer of public opinion on both legitimate 
government restrictions and security force 
overreach alike. Since the start of the pandemic 
emergency in Mozambique, Nigeria, and Pakistan, 
both parties to the governance relationship have 
been looking more askance at each other than 
before, homing in on each other’s perceived 
weak flanks under increased pressures of all 
kinds including, crucially, on public finances and 
aid flows. In this latest episode of an ongoing 
distancing and withdrawal of trust, the default 
mode has been one of suspicion. 
k The phrase is borrowed from a Pakistan observatory panel member.
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Following in the footsteps of repressive states 
elsewhere that have developed sophisticated 
repertoires of social and judicial harassment of 
activists182, elements within these three countries’ 
states are set to continue ‘oppositionising’ the 
more contestatory segments of civil society, driving 
it into the arms of the political opposition and 
possibly even armed insurgent opposition in some 
instances. As authoritarian and autocratisation 
patterns deepen, civil society actors, turned 
into victims of acute human rights abuses, are 
becoming more explicitly anti-government in 
their narrative and consolidating adversarial and 
denunciatory identities, as seen in practices like 
honouring as martyrs the individuals most acutely 
persecuted by the state.
In settings of acutely polarised government–civil 
society relations, collapse of the rule of law 
and direct oppression of civil society, bilateral 
official and non-governmental aid has been 
able to play an important role when it has been 
politically savvy, adaptive and risk-taking183. Often 
this has involved suspension of government-
to-government aid, with non-governmental 
international solidarity channels coming to 
the fore instead, as well as more deliberate 
and visible alignment of donor countries’ aid 
operations with their diplomatic operations. 
There is a history of the United Nations system 
playing a central role in such polarised settings, 
particularly through the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights and its Special 
Rapporteurs on key civic freedoms and acute 
forms of rights violations184. The challenge to 
official aid donors operating in Mozambique, 
Nigeria and Pakistan and similar contexts today 
is to both adapt their own bilateral roles to the 
evolving dynamics of civic space, and to act in 
concert to bolster the legitimacy, reach and 
effectiveness of the multilateral UN human 
rights system. 
5.3 For civil society and civic 
action: Weathering, circumventing 
or countering the constraints
Despite the evidence of newfound coalitions and 
solidarity especially early in the pandemic, the 
fractures showing up in civil society in all three 
countries look likely to widen. Fragmentation will 
be driven by growing competition between CSOs 
for dwindling external and government funding 
and for favour with the state, and by mounting 
pressure towards welfare and relief work and 
away from advocacy. Civil society in Mozambique, 
Nigeria and Pakistan may see the emergence 
of small but stronger and more significant 
contentious segments than have existed before, 
even while other CSOs retreat from advocacy 
into uncontroversial service provision roles. 
The increasingly sophisticated, targeted and 
overt fake news strategies deployed by these and 
other governments are likely to continue limiting, 
monitoring, stigmatising and discrediting both 
civic space as an arena and civil society actors 
themselves. The shift of civic activism online will 
continue to be an empowering trend. But a key 
question will be how fast and how far the shifts 
online of activism are mirrored by shifts online 
of surveillance, harassment, delegitimisation 
and sabotage, and how well activists succeed in 
shielding themselves against its worst effects, 
exposing it and campaigning for online privacy 
and safety. Another question is to what extent 
the online activism initially spawned by crisis 
can evolve in the longer term into sustained 
movements for change, online, offline or 
combined. 
More positively, civic action has found fresh 
impetus through this crisis. The pandemic and 
the injustices it laid bare have had a political 
consciousness-raising effect, igniting existing 
campaigners, protesters and accountability 
claimants and enlisting new recruits into activist 
expressions of critique and moral outrage. Some 
of these expressions relate to pandemic-induced 
privations and abuses committed under cover of 
the pandemic. Others are defences of civic space 
itself, asserting the role of civil society in holding 
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governments to account, and some model non-
hierarchical and democratic practices and cultures 
within that space. 
Also positively, the new focus on monitoring 
Covid-19 relief to try to ensure fair distribution and 
transparent, accountable management testifies 
to new levels of indignation at the violation of 
the ‘moral economy’ that underpins popular 
expectations of how public provision should 
work185. This may well translate longer-term into 
more homegrown citizen oversight and advocacy 
on normal public expenditure as well as emergency 
relief. While the leadership roles assumed in some 
Covid-19 emergency contexts by celebrities and 
social influencers may prove to be fleeting, the 
coalitions emerging around shared occupational, 
demographic or political identities are likely to 
endure, deepen and perhaps even become cross-
class alliances as the longer-lasting effects of the 
pandemic and policy and budget responses are felt 
on livelihoods and lifestyles. No less will be needed, 
to hold open a further-shrinking civic space.
The navigation strategies of civil society actors 
in these changing civic spaces are likely to settle 
down and become more distinct with time. Should 
they build on service delivery relationships forged 
with government in crisis? Should they get behind 
and amplify popular politics and civic indignation? 
While most CSOs will probably adopt a mixed 
strategy for pragmatic reasons, many will be forced 
to hone their political identities more definitively 
than before. Civil society may well segment into 
actors that weather civil-society-restricting moves, 
those that circumvent them, and those that 
actively counter them – and the latter will need 
to work more centrally on movement-building, 
organising and coalition strategies in order to 
survive and thrive in the civic space of the future. 
5.4 Conclusion
The shifts in citizen-state relations we have 
seen intensify during the pandemic call for 
re-strategising, re-positioning and re-tooling 
by advocates of democracy and accountable 
governance at all levels. Activists and civic 
organisations will have difficult choices to make, 
and need to chart a careful path to maintain 
solidarity across causes and identities. International 
actors, including aid donors, need to revive 
approaches used in the least democratic settings 
and in less democratic global eras. In contexts 
where civil society, civic space and government 
notions of accountability have been heavily shaped 
by international aid, the defence of civic space and 
assertion of accountability claims over the past 
year by domestic social actors – not dominated 
by donors or international NGOs – hold particular 
promise. The energy generated to monitor civic 
freedoms and call out the democratic backsliding 
we have seen during the pandemic must be 
sustained, and both national and international 
attention focused on the dangers of emergence 
from the pandemic with our civil liberties eroded 
and autocratic governance normalised.
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